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ARTICLE
Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete
Institutionalism
GREGG P. MACEY*
This Article outlines what I refer to as the "incomplete institutionalism" of
law and economics, a condition that weakens the field's predictions for
bargaining and what it has to say about regulatory choice. I chart this
condition, borne out of our failure to finish the work that Coase began on
institutions, in the area of environmental law. Scholars concerned with the
pollution problem make ample use of Calabresi and Melamed's Cathedral
framework, one of the most powerful lenses in legal scholarship.' Yet as it is
applied in the form of arguments over transaction costs, there are cracks in
the glass that blur how we choose among competing regulations. A more
complete account of institutions, building on advancements in organization
theory, reveals a second set of transaction costs that arise as firms make
decisions and carry out regulatory initiatives. These costs rival the holdout,
free rider, and bilateral monopoly costs that are of primary interest to
property theorists. If properly addressed, they can lead to dramatic improve-
ments in environmental protection.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the founding cornerstone was set in place for Calabresi and Melamed's
Cathedral,1 law and economics scholars have worked to enrich our understand-
ing of environmental pollution and how the state should protect the property
rights of victims. 2 Beginning with treatments of nuisance law,3 they have come
at the problem from a range of perspectives, whether advocating the primacy of
one protective rule over another (for example, liability rules over property rules
4
or vice versa 5) or applying theoretical models to real-world strategies of environ-
1. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv.
115, 124 (2004); Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 113, 143 (2005).
3. Studies of nuisance law rely heavily on "Boomer-like examples." Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of
The Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2175-76 & n.6 (1997) (describing use of stylized versions of
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), in articles comparing the use of "property
rules" and "liability rules" to protect the rights of residents living near an industrial facility).
4. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Nonconsensual
Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 237 (1995); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
A Theory of Property, 90 CoRNeL L. REv. 531, 590 (2005); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property
Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REv. 713, 721 (1996); Stewart E.
Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MINcH. L. Rev. 1285,
1290-92 (2008).
5. See, e.g., RIcHARD A. PosNER, EcoNONc ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (4th ed. 1992); Daphna Lewinsohn-
Zamir, More Is Not Always Better than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REv. 634,
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mental regulation.6 In assessing available tools for environmental regulation,7
law and economics scholars inevitably turn to transaction costs8 and their
effects on bargaining among the parties to an environmental dispute.9 Transac-
tion costs, we are told, should guide the state, whether through its courts or its
regulatory apparatus, in its choice of one mode of property protection over
another.
I argue that this understanding of the problem is incomplete. The focus on
transaction costs when deciding how to protect legal entitlements is a natural
result of the usual pairing of The Cathedral with the writings of Coase,
particularly his conception of nuisance law as a bargaining problem. ° Yet law
and economics scholars' study of nuisance law and environmental protection
sidesteps a second set of transaction costs that arise from a proper understand-
ing of Coase's broader concern with institutions."t Mention is given to the
689 (2008); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.YU. L. Rev. 1719, 1721-23, 1732-36
(2004); Sterk, supra note 4, at 1290.
6. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.YU. L. REv. 1495,
1540-41 (1999) (arguing that as information costs decrease, "so do transaction costs, bringing us closer
to the day when a Coasian world of informed, low-cost exchanges of rights becomes possible,"
meaning market controls will become more substitutable for regulatory restrictions); Kaplow &
Shavell, supra note 4, at 713, 750-51 ("Another implication of our analysis is that pollution taxes are
preferable to the system of tradeable pollution rights that is in partial use today.").
7. Regulatory comparisons are often fit problematically within a single quadrant in Calabresi and
Melamed's now-ubiquitous entitlement protection box. See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal
Delegation and Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MicH. L. REv. 1, 3 (2001); see also
Rose, supra note 3, at 2191-92 (arguing that Kaplow & Shavell's analogy of command-and-control
environmental rules to "property rule" solutions is incorrect and that such rules would more accurately
be categorized as liability or inalienability rules).
8. ROBERT CooTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNoMics 93 (3d ed. 2000) (presenting the "norma-
tive Coase theorem," which states that the law should be structured so that it "remove[s] the
impediments to private agreements"); David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transac-
tion Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 AR. L. REv. 61, 69
(2005) ("[S]cholars endorse the view that the choice between property and liability rules should reduce
the transaction costs of bargaining around judicial decisions."); Yang Wang, Now, Later or Never:
Applying Asymmetric Discount Rates in Nuisance Remedies and Federal Regulations, 105 MicH. L.
REv. 2035, 2059 (2007) ("[Tlhe choice between property rules ... and liability rules ... largely turns
on the level of transaction costs anticipated in transferring an entitlement protected by a property
rule.").
9. For example, we learn that when there is a single plaintiff and multiple defendants or vice
versa, bargaining among the parties will prove difficult due to holdout and free rider costs,
meaning there will not likely be an exchange of entitlements protected by a property rule.
Therefore, liability rules should be applied. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106-08. But
see Sterk, supra note 4, at 1290-91 ("[I]n a pollution dispute, if the court awards damages that
exceed actual harm, the polluter will stop polluting even though it would be efficient for the
polluter to continue, while if actual harm exceeds the damages awarded, the polluter will continue
to pollute even though the pollution is inefficient. As a result, a liability rule guarantees efficient
results only when damages are equal to actual harm.").
10. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4-8 (1960).
11. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386-87 (1937) [hereinafter Coase,
The Nature of the Finn]. Coase's exploration of institutions began with his observation that markets and
firms perform the same function (production of goods and services) yet continue to coexist. Id. at 388.
This suggests that at times, the costs associated with operating within a market (such as the costs of
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Coase theorem 2 or to why certain kinds of transaction costs should lead the
state to shift from, say, property rights to liability rule protection when a facility
emits a noxious substance that drifts into the yards of neighboring homeowners.
But there is an eerie emptiness and mechanically strategic quality to the actors
in these scenarios, which scholars draw upon to make claims such as the
following: "victims of pollution are unlikely to bargain with those responsible
for it";1 3 multiple parties on one side of a dispute (such as homeowners) are
"bad choosers" such that cost-based decisions should be left to the singular
polluting entity; 14 and transaction costs associated with strategic concerns (such
as holdouts and free riders) make bargaining impossible among large numbers
of parties.15
The predictive models also fail some important empirical tests. A growing
number of communities, each encompassing hundreds of residents, have in fact
solved the initial "problem of reaching an agreement over a public bad,"'
16
negotiating contracts) will prove significant, leading a company to regularize some of those market
negotiations by bringing them in-house (the famous "make-or-buy" question). Id. at 390-92. Institu-
tions continue to serve as the protagonists in new institutional economics. Coase argues that "[i]t makes
little sense for economists to discuss the process of exchange without specifying the institutional setting
within which the trading takes place, since this affects the incentives to produce and the costs of
transacting." R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 713, 718 (1992)
[hereinafter Coase, Institutional Structure].
12. What is widely regarded as the "Coase theorem" is the notion that in a world with zero or very
low transaction costs, "the allocation of resources is independent of the initial assignment of property
rights." Deirdre McCloskey, Other Things Equal: The So-Called Coase Theorem, 24 E. EcON. J. 367,
367 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). The true implication of Coase's work is that where transaction
costs cannot be removed, it does matter, for example, "where the liability for pollution is placed." Id. at
368. Coase made this central thesis of The Problem of Social Cost clear when he argued that
[o]nce the costs of carrying out market transactions are taken into account it is clear that...
a rearrangement of rights will only be undertaken when the increase in the value of production
consequent upon the rearrangement is greater than the costs which would be involved in
bringing it about. When it is less, the granting of an injunction ... or the liability to pay
damages may result in an activity being discontinued ... which would be undertaken if
market transactions were costless.
Coase, supra note 10, at 15-16.
13. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 749.
14. James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 440, 470 (1995); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 381-82 (2001) (reviewing the
argument that in large-n situations, liability rules, or entitlements that permit forced exchange in return
for the payment of just compensation, are more appropriate).
15. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunc-
tive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L. RaV. 1075, 1109 (1980).
16. CHARLEs D. KOLSTAD, E~m om rAL EcoNoNUcs 109 (2000). Kolstad gives an example of a
power plant with the right to pollute an area where twenty people live. The damage to each person from
the pollution is $5, and the cost to clean up the plant is $91:
Suppose first that the right to pollute is vested with the power plant. The Coase Theorem
suggests that efficiency (pollution control) can be attained via payments from the individuals
to the plant. Indeed, one possibility is that all 20 people get together, each contributes $4.55
(for a total of $91), and the plant is paid to clean-up.... However, if two people get the idea
to free-ride, there is no way the other 18 people can pool money to raise $91 while
[Vol. 98:863
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despite the predictions of law and economics scholars. In California, residents
from unincorporated towns and a public housing development signed a memoran-
dum of understanding with Unocal, agreeing to parameters for continued refin-
ery operations weeks after the accidental release of a refinery catalyst that can
cause neurological damage and other health problems. 17 In Denver, Colorado,
residents of several neighborhoods successfully bargained for improvements at
a Conoco refinery following a series of nonpermitted emissions. s And in
Manchester, Texas, Rh6ne Poulenc and several communities agreed to indepen-
dent environmental audits, data sharing, and other provisions after a sulfur
dioxide release increased scrutiny of a permit modification. 9 These and other
agreements20 were reached between a facility and a multitude of pollution
victims who avoided party identification, coordination, free rider, and holdout
problems, the standard sources of transaction costs used to predict unsuccessful
bargaining.21
Such results should not appear surprising. That they do suggests that there
are Coasean blind spots that plague law and economics scholars' treatment
of environmental disputes. In what are usually very stylized accounts of
bargaining, little is said about the organizations (such as a petrochemical
facility or regulatory agency) called upon to consider alternatives and make
decisions about an ongoing pollution problem, or the institutional environ-
ment 22 in which they operate. One-dimensional "injurers" and "victims"
cause harm, make offers, and accept payments according to available infor-
mation on environmental effects and prevention costs. 23 By treating parties
to a dispute as essentially unitary and atomistic, with the exception of some
individually paying no more than the $5 of damage. Consequently, the problems of free-riding
combined with private information on damages make it very difficult to reach a Coasian
solution ....
Id. at 110.
17. Good Neighbor Agreement Between the Crockett/Rodeo Coal., Shoreline Envtl. Alliance,
Citizens for a Better Env't, & the Unocal Corp. (Apr. 7, 1995).
18. Settlement Agreement & Release Between COPIRG Citizen Lobby, Michael Maes, Lorraine
Granado, & Conoco, Inc. (Apr. 29, 1999).
19. Settlement Agreement & Proposed Class 3 Modification to Permit No. HW-50095 Between
Texans United Educ. Fund, Manchester Residents & Rhfne Poulenc (Nov. 1992).
20. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the Cmty. Groups W. County Toxics Coal.,
People Do!, Citizens for a Better Env't, & Chevron Richmond Refinery (May 31, 1994).
21. See Sterk, supra note 4, at 1290 ("[H]igh transaction costs [are] typically defined as cases in
which multiple parties generate the potential for holdouts and freeriders."); cf Stephen N. Bretsen &
Peter J. Hill, Irrigation Institutions in the American West, 25 UCLA J. EwVrL. L. & POL'Y 283, 288-89
(2007) ("Several types of transaction costs influenced the development of the type of organizations used
by settlers in the American West[, including] ... asset specificity and opportunism, holdout problems,
and free-rider problems.").
22. An institutional context includes "all organizations within a society supplying a given type of
product or service together with their associated organizational sectors: suppliers, financiers, regulators,
and so forth." W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions
and Early Evidence, in THE NEW INsTIutrnoNALSM tN ORGAN ZATIONAL ANALYsIs 108 (Walter W. Powell
& Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
23. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 733-34.
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recent modifications to the rational actor assumption for individuals,2" the
scholarship ignores many of the key insights that a focus on institutions
would provide about what shapes organizational behavior in a highly regu-
lated setting. Attempts to incorporate lessons from new institutional econom-
ics 25 into nuisance law and environmental regulation leave much to be
explained. 26 All the while, transaction cost approaches are scaled up to
analyze an array of environmental laws, including the Superfund program
27
and .emissions trading.28
This Article outlines what I refer to as the "incomplete institutionalism" of
24. Several scholars have begun to correct for individual rationality assumptions in the nuisance
literature. Farnsworth, in his classic treatment of post-judgment bargaining among parties to
nuisance disputes, focused on the "endowment effect," which is an observed difference between
what parties are willing to pay for a good and what they demand for it if it already belongs to them.
Farnsworth suggested that "a strong endowment effect attaches to judgments from a court,"
although he cautioned against using the effect as an explanatory tool without carefully defining the
concept. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse
Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 373, 381, 394 (1999). More recently, Rachel Godsil
explored the endowment effect and other deviations from individual rationality within the context
of South Camden Citizens In Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 446 (D.N.J. 2001). Rachel D. Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L.J. 1807, 1813 (2004).
Finally, Parchomovsky and Siegelman showed how "community externalities" such as interper-
sonal networks can facilitate a neighborhood's ratification of a buy out agreement. Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and
Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 113-19 (2004); see also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1476-79
(1998) (discussing effects of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest);
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited:
Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEx. L. REv. 219, 227-31 (2001) (discussing
findings in behavioral studies to illustrate divergence between "conventional economic assump-
tions of human opportunism and greediness and people's 'real-life' behavior").
25. New institutional economics is a revitalization of Coase's work led by Oliver Williamson. Oliver
E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 595,
601-02 (2000); see ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO a PRESENT AND BEYOND (Oliver
E. Williamson ed., 1995).
26. Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 8, at 106-10 (focusing on transaction cost economics and arguing
for an analysis of costs that includes awareness of the need to generate transaction costs to align private
incentives with public goods, as in the context of emissions trading); Esty, supra note 2, at 141-42
(extending Williamson's comparison of markets and hierarchy to negotiated exchange of property
rights and command-and-control regulation).
27. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006), and the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11023 (2006), give the Environmental Protection
Agency broad authority to respond to and clean up past releases of hazardous substances.
Alexander E. Farrell, Overview of the Superfund Program, in RECLAIMING THE LAND: RETHINKING
SUPERFUND INSTITUTIONS, METHODS AND PRACTICES 25, 26-28 (Gregg P. Macey & Jonathan Z.
Cannon eds., 2007); see George Van Cleve, Would the Superfund Response Cost Allocation
Procedures Considered by the 103d Congress Reduce Transaction Costs?, 25 ENvTL. L. REP.
10,134, 10,134 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Susan Bruninga, Water Pollution: Draft Policy Statement Being Crafted by EPA on
Market-Based Approaches, DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA), No. 230, Dec. 3, 2001, at A-2; Byron Swift,
Grandfathering, New Source Review, and NO--Making Sense of a Flawed System, DAILY Ertv'T. REP.
(BNA), No. 136, July 14, 2000, at B-l, B-6 to B-7.
[Vol. 98:863
COASEAN BLIND SPOTS
law and economics, a condition that weakens the validity of its predictions for
bargaining and what it has to say about competing forms of regulation. This
condition stems from law and economics' inordinate focus on one of the two
core behavioral assumptions of new institutional economics.29 It is perpetuated
by the lack of a rigorous account of how a firm's response to transaction costs,
given its behavioral constraints, will divert it from efficiency in predictable
ways. A more careful analysis of the inner workings of organizations reveals
how this happens: a second set of transaction costs arises as firms make
decisions. These costs, if properly addressed, can lead to dramatic improve-
ments in bargaining efficiency and environmental protection. But so far, we
remain oblivious to the blind spots and focus instead on avoiding costs due to
holdouts, free riders, and other forms of strategic behavior. In turn, we leave
cost-based decisions to complex organizations, heralded as the "lowest-cost
avoiders" and viewed as ideally suited for market-based and voluntary regula-
tory schemes.
To explore how to address this hidden array of transaction costs, I carried out
case studies of three environmental bargaining situations. Through my findings
I show that a more complete account of institutions, building on advancements
in theories of organizational behavior, will lead to richer and more accurate
prescriptive advice for agencies, communities, and regulated firms. 3° When we
peer into the Coasean blind spots of law and economics, we unearth new
transaction costs that hold clear implications for environmental law and the
daily enactment of pollution control. I explore how these costs (referred to
collectively as "script-based" transaction costs) operate behind the scenes,
within organizations brought to the bargaining table after an industrial accident
or dramatic regulatory shift. As is true for costs linked to strategic behavior
(such as holdout and free rider), I show that script-based transaction costs,
which emerge as firms cope with their limited ability to process information and
other symptoms of bounded rationality, eliminate much of the potential for an
efficient solution.
First, I introduce Coase's work on institutions, its resurrection by new
institutional economics and broadened understanding in organization theory,
and the roots of incomplete institutionalism in Part I. After analyzing three
environmental bargaining situations from an institutionalist perspective in Part
II, I turn to how the additional categories of transaction costs should influence
our comparative analysis of environmental regulations in Part III.
29. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
30. A more comprehensive focus on institutions also provides a bridge for scholars historically
concerned with linking economic efficiency and social justice. Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal
Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv.
1393, 1424 (1996) (describing how institutional analysis could provide a methodology unifying
fields historically concerned with efficiency, such as economics, and justice, such as political
analysis).
2010]
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I. INCOMPLETE INSTITUTIONALISM IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
Incomplete institutionalism echoes one of Coase's foundational critiques of
Pigouvian regulation,31 namely his claim that the root causes of an environmen-
tal nuisance are reciprocal. Coase argued that the standard treatment in welfare
economics of a factory emitting harmful substances into neighboring properties,
which directs lawmakers to either hold the facility owner liable or issue a
pollution tax, failed to recognize the reciprocal nature of pollution: "To avoid
the harm to [residents] would inflict harm on [the facility owner]. The real
question that has to be decided is: should A be allowed to harm B or should B
be allowed to harm A? The problem is to avoid the more serious harm."32 A
structurally similar criticism can be made of law and economics: the field does
not sufficiently account for the reciprocal nature of transaction costs. Transac-
tion costs affect and are shaped by the institutions that firms create to address
them. To understand this reciprocal process, I define institutions broadly, in
accordance with recent developments in organization theory. Institutions are the
"cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide
stability and meaning to social behavior" and that are perpetuated by routines
and other social forces.33
New institutional economists focus on how transaction costs drive the struc-
ture of an organization, and law and economics scholars compare the efficiency
of available regulatory tools given the intensity of transaction costs in a setting.
But the opposite causal direction-where institutions, introduced at a prior
point in time to manage transaction costs, become entrenched and alter the array
of transaction costs that an organization must face-is not given the appropriate
level of attention. One of Coase's more recent critiques of economic theory
helps to explain this oversight: it does not show sufficient interest "in the
internal arrangements within organizations. 34 To appreciate the full array of
transaction costs that act upon organizations as they bargain or enact regula-
tions, we need to account for the reciprocal interaction of (a) transaction costs
and (b) the institutions firms develop to manage or reduce them. This process
often occurs within organizations and spreads across their competitive and
regulatory environments.
The incomplete institutionalism of law and economics is striking given the
origins of the field, which began as an attack on the supposed rationality of
public institutions. Public choice theorists argued that legislators and execu-
tives, acting individually to consolidate their power (for example, through
re-election), maximized their utility but limited the rational behavior of their
31. See generally A.C. Piou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 131-37 (3d ed. 1929).
32. Coase, supra note 10, at 2; see also Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15
J.L. & ECON. 427,436-37 (1972).
33. W. RicHARD SCOT, INSTIT=tONS AND ORGANzATnONS 33 (1995) (emphasis omitted).
34. Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 714.
[Vol. 98:863
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branches of government. 35 Both the organizations where these actors worked
and the laws and regulations they imposed were treated as irrational because
they were inefficient or furthered something other than their stated objectives.36
As I will discuss, new institutional economics and, to a greater extent, organiza-
tion theory also focus on departures from rationality, such as when organiza-
tions adopt practices to help manage legitimacy rather than for efficiency
purposes. Attention turns from the conscious decision making of public choice
theory to the vast array of more tacit assumptions, such as scripts, rules, and
classifications that steer organizations away from decisions driven simply by
cost-benefit analysis. These forces explain far more of the variance in organiza-
tional behavior and departure from rationality, yet theories regarding the effects
of these forces have yet to be internalized by law and economics. The intersec-
tion of law and economics and environmental law is an ideal space in which to
explore such a theoretical upgrade. Few areas of activity involve more efforts
by firms to conform to state-sanctioned symbols of legitimacy while neglecting
pure performance-based indicators than pollution control and prevention.
A. THE SURPRISING OUTCOMES OF FENCELINE BARGAINING
In 1973, there was an explosion on my street. A family, and one of my
ex-students, was burned by an explosion that was caused by a young man
whom I taught. He was cutting grass in his yard and his lawnimower hit one of
the pipelines, ethylene pipelines that somehow, some way connected with
Shell Chemical that's directly in front of my house ... it ignited, and there
were two lives that were lost, and it was the lady who was in the house
sleeping, the house caught afire, and the young boy who was on fire as he cut
the grass.
37
The literal extension of a Shell Chemical facility into the yards of single-
family homes, described by a resident of a small town along the Mississippi
River, is one of many instances where the boundary between a residential area
and a chemical facility is blurred to an uncomfortable degree. Roughly 15,000
of these facilities use or store toxic or flammable substances that are of the
greatest risk to human health, not to mention thousands more involved in
treatment and disposal.3a The potential for environmental harms and disputes
over property entitlements in these communities is vast. For one who has never
35. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PInIP P FRIcKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 3, 20--23 (1991).
36. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 152-54 (1st ed. 1972); R.H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 39-40 (1959).
37. Interview with Margie Richard, President, Concerned Citizens of Norco, in Diamond, La. (Feb.
28, 2001).
38. U.S. GEN. ACCOUTING OFFCE, HomELArN SECURrry: FEDERAL ACrION NEEDED To ADDRESS
SECurnr CHALILENES AT CHEMICAL FACILITmES 1 (2004) (report and statement of John B. Stephenson,
Director of Natural Resources and Environment, submitted to the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, of the House of Representatives).
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been to places such as Norco, Louisiana, the first moments spent in these
neighborhoods can be an exercise in sensory overload. In Norco, symbols of
risks to human health abound: odors, repetitive noises, loudspeakers, flaring,
"blazing" (high flares), and imposing physical structures such as storage tanks
are ever present.39
Residents of these communities regularly endure industrial accidents. Chemi-
cal, refinery, and storage tank accidents "are plentiful, and serious enough in
terms of catastrophic potential." 4 Indeed, accident rates in Saint Charles Parish
are high. For instance, between January 1998 and June 1999, the Shell Norco
complex averaged over 3.5 accidents per month resulting in a chemical re-
lease.41 The Orion refinery experienced forty accidents between May 1 and
November 12, 2000.42 In addition, the Norco facilities are prone to vast
quantities of fugitive emissions, which stem from thousands of pumps, valves,
and other elements of a chemical facility that degrade or malfunction.43 Shell
Chemical alone has more than 200,000 emissions points. Failure to adequately
check these points at the Shell Norco complex has been extensively docu-
mented.44
In response to industrial accidents, residents take matters into their own
hands, asserting their collective security needs and "right to know" as spelled
out in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EP-
CRA)45 and developing innovative right-to-inspect and other citizen participa-
tion mechanisms that they promote through negotiations with targeted facilities.
Residents organize around industrial accidents and form community-based
organizations that operate in areas previously the sole purview of regulatory
39. See Dara O'Rourke & Gregg P. Macey, Community Environmental Policing: Assessing New
Strategies of Public Participation in Environmental Regulation, 22 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 383,
392 n. 12 (2003).
40. CHARLES PERROw, NORMAL AccIDENTs: LIVING wrrH IhGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 102 (1999).
41. See CONCERNED CITIZENS OF NORCO, SIERRA CLUB-DELTA CHAPTER, XAVIER UNIV. DEEP SOUTH Cm.
FOR ENvTL. JusTICE, AND EARTHJUSTICE LEGAL DEF. FuND, SHELL-NORCO, Toxic NEIGHBOR: THE CASE FOR
RELOCATON 5 (1999).
42. NEW SARPY CONCERNED CrrzENs & LA. BucKEr BRIGADE, STATE OF THE ART OR FALLING APART? 3
(2000).
43. For example, fugitive emissions from the Shell Chemical plant's East Site in Norco equaled
345,146 pounds in 2008, compared with 464,238 pounds from stack emissions. UNITED STATES
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVLROFACrS MULTISYSTEM REPORT ON SHELL CHEMICAL LP NORCO
CHEMICAL PLANT, EAST SrrE, http:/loaspub.epa.govlenvirolmultisys2.get-list?facilityuin= 110013831201
(last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
44. Consent Decree, United States v. Motiva Enters., No. H-01-0978 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 2001).
45. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, §§ 300-
330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728-58 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (2006)). EPCRA was
enacted after chemical releases involving two Union Carbide plants in 1984 (in Bhopal, India and
Institute, West Virginia). In both cases, government officials discovered that the extent of the disaster
was heightened by a lack of adequate emergency planning. Following a study commissioned the
following year by the Environmental Protection Agency (identifying over 6,900 chemical spill acci-
dents across the country in the previous five years), Congress enacted legislation to improve the
public's knowledge of chemicals in their communities and to create plans at each level of government
to respond to future accidents. H.R. REP. No. 99-962 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
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agencies, such as environmental monitoring and planning.4 6 They begin new
initiatives for environmental assessment, monitoring conditions through use of
"bucket brigades," "spill teams," "flare cams," "reactant bags," and other
low-tech strategies; 47 deliberate over pollution levels and other concerns through
"good neighbor agreements" ;48 and engage agencies through sophisticated uses
of Toxics Release Inventory data.4 9 These efforts lead to bargaining situations
between community and corporation. That agreements are reached between a
polluting firm and informal organizations of hundreds of residents-on every-
thing from the wholesale relocation of the Diamond community in Norco,
Louisiana5 ° to the appropriate level of emissions51 to the financial contributions
of a refinery owner in exchange for a new operating permit52-is only surpris-"
ing given standard law and economics accounts. I will focus elsewhere on how
such agreements are reached.53 In this Article, I am concerned with the kind of
agreement reached and its lack of efficiency (from the perspective of cost-
effective reduction of environmental burdens). So far, legal scholars have
focused on the nature of the surprise: parties overcame strategic barriers to
agreement, including transaction costs due to holdout, coordination, and free
rider problems.54 What is absent from the literature is an account of the
mechanisms by which the behavioral regularities ("scripts") 55 adopted by an
organization to cope with its complex and uncertain environment can diminish
its ability to bargain efficiently with other parties.
B. ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Coase is celebrated for introducing transaction costs into economic analy-
46. See generally Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: Injustice
Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 508 (2000)
(outlining the rise of the community-based environmental justice movement and its influence on
environmental research and policy).
47. O'Rourke & Macey, supra note 39, at 385; see GREGG P. MACEY, SHELTERING IN PLACE:
NEGOTIATING WITH IRRATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 6 (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with author).
48. GREGG P. MACEY & LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, USING DISPUTE RESOLUTION TECHNIQUES TO ADDRESS
ENViRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS: CASE STUDIES 50 (2003).
49. Section 313 of EPCRA mandates that the EPA give the public access to information collected
annually on routine releases of chemicals falling within Standard Industrial Classifications 20-39 and
released from facilities that employ ten or more workers and use more than 10,000 pounds of a listed
chemical within a calendar year. This information is presented in a searchable index and in map form at
http://www.scorecard.org.
50. STEVE LERNER, DiAMoND: A STRUGGLE FOR ENvIRoNmENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA'S CHEMICAL
CORRIDOR 245-60 (2005).
51. Settlement Agreement & Release, supra note 18, at 2.
52. Good Neighbor Agreement, supra note 17, at 1-8, 15.
53. MACEY, supra note 47.
54. See generally Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 24 (exploring how a small town avoided
collective action and holdout problems when it accepted a buyout offer from a neighboring power
company).
55. See infra notes 150-73 and accompanying text.
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sis,56 yet his interest in a series of nuisance cases in The Problem of Social Cost
(Social Cost)57 spanned far beyond the "zero transaction cost" thought experi-
ments visited upon thousands of law students each year.58 In Coase's own
words, the Coase theorem is most useful as a "stepping stone on the way to an
analysis of an economy with positive transaction costs."59 The main task at
hand is to study not simply the efficient allocation of legal entitlements, but the
emergence of institutional arrangements for dealing with an externality. Social
Cost echoed arguments that Coase developed in an earlier lecture and article,
The Nature of the Firm,6° explaining that organizing transactions through a firm
rather than the market is "not the only possible answer' 61 to problems such as
polluting factories:
In the standard case of a smoke nuisance, which may affect a vast number of
people engaged in a wide variety of activities, the administrative costs might
well be so high as to make any attempt to deal with the problem within the
confines of a single firm impossible. An alternative solution is direct Govern-
ment regulation. Instead of instituting a legal system of rights which can be
modified by transactions on the market, the government may impose regula-
tions ....
... But the governmental administrative machine is not itself costless. It
can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly. Furthermore, there is no reason
to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible
administration subject to political pressures and operating without any competi-
tive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the efficiency with
which the economic system operates.... [I]t follows that direct governmental
regulation will not necessarily give better results than leaving the problem to
be solved by the market or the firm.62
The basic insight linking The Nature of the Finn, Social Cost, and more recent
work by new institutional economists is that in a world where contracting is
necessarily incomplete (given positive costs of search, information, negotiation,
56. John Commons also wrote in the early 1930s that transactions should be the basic unit of
analysis in economics. JOHN R. COMMONS, INSTTUTIONAL EcONOMICS: ITS PLACE IN PoLInCAL ECONOMY
4-9 (1934).
57. Coase introduced Social Cost as a work "concerned with those actions of business firms which
have harmful effects on others," including the "standard example" of "a factory the smoke from which
has harmful effects on those occupying neighbouring properties." Coase, supra note 10, at 1.
58. Coase tried, admittedly in vain, to distance himself from the legal academy's focus on hypotheti-
cal, zero transaction cost bargaining situations. See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW
15 (1988).
59. Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 717.
60. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, supra note 11.




and enforcement),63 negotiation costs can be reduced by bringing them within
the boundaries of a firm (where hierarchies are substituted for contractual
bargaining) or addressing them via government regulation.
Legal scholars often take a circuitous route to institutional analysis, starting
with Coase's thought experiment involving the costs of trading legal rights after
they are assigned. This was particularly true after entitlement assignment and
protection were so elegantly systematized in the form of a typology in The
Cathedral. Much of the literature is devoted to crafting directives for use after
an initial question is answered about a given situation: "Are transaction costs
high?" Such rules of thumb include: assign entitlements to parties who value
them most;64 when valuation is difficult, give entitlements to parties who can
most easily initiate an exchange; 65 and when transaction costs are low, absolute
entitlements (that is, property rules) are preferable.66 Not concerned with the
institutions that guide organizational decision making, these rules for choosing
among property rules, liability rules, and hybrids of the two 6 7 are analogized to
various environmental regulations.68 In turn, the directives frame choices among
an array of solutions to the pollution problem, from command-and-control to
common law to market to informational approaches.
The dominant framework of law and economics also explains why a more
63. Coase first defined "transaction costs" in The Nature of the Firm. Coase, The Nature of the Firm,
supra note 11, at 390-91. His definition appeared in simplified form in Social Cost:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes
to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct
negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection
needed to make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so on.
Coase, supra note 10, at 15. Other definitions abound, focused to varying degrees on identification,
information, negotiation, and enforcement costs. See, e.g., EHRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER,
INSTrTUTIONS AND ECONOMIc THEORY: THE CoNTRIBuIoN OF THE NEw INsTrrUTIONAL ECONoMIcs 40 (1997)
(defining transaction costs as the costs of measuring resources or claims, understanding and utilizing
rights, and negotiating and enforcing transactions); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68 n.5 ("By transaction costs, I have
in mind costs like those of getting large numbers of people together to bargain .....
64. PosNER, supra note 5, at 45-47.
65. Calabresi, supra note 63, at 72.
66. RicHARD A. PosNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JusTIcE 70-71 (1981).
67. Wang, supra note 8, at 2060 (arguing that in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970), the court considered "the possibility of time dividing the protection of an entitlement
between liability and property rules").
68. See, e.g., Murray B. Rutherford, Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas C. Brown, Assessing Environmental
Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 94 (1998)
(analogizing property rules and liability rules to environmental damage assessments); Jonathan Baert
Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677,
682, 704-13 (1999) (considering whether property-based rules or liability rules should be used to
address global environmental problems); Jodo C.J.G. de Medeiros, Note, How the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality Has Created a Gap in Environmental Protection at the 49th Parallel, 92 MtN. L.
REV. 529, 562 nn.230-31 (2007) (outlining the differences in application of the National Environmental
Policy Act (described as a rule-based property regulation) and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Recovery Act (labeled as a liability rule regulation)).
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complete understanding of institutions (which Coase defined broadly as the
legal, political, and social systems that determine "the costs of exchange" 69 and
which new institutional economics often views narrowly as how a firm's
structure is shaped by transaction costs70 ) has yet to develop in legal scholar-
ship. Following public choice theory, law and economics focuses on the relative
performance of predetermined institutional choices. Institutional alternatives,
such as the market, political branches, and the courts, are imperfect yet readily
available options, evaluated for their degree of fit with a market failure that
demands attention.7 1 This has been called the central post-Coase question:
"[W]hether significant transaction costs are present and, if so, which social
arrangement" will best address them.72 The mechanisms by which a host of
other (at times more subtle) institutions emerge, respond to transaction costs,
and become embedded within organizations, grow faint by the time these
comparative analyses are made, joining a variety of other background assump-
tions.
C. THE PROJECT OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Coase acknowledged that his work on institutions remains unfinished.73 For
example, he did not indicate which factors influence the choice of whether to
organize a collective pursuit within a firm, within a market, or via government
regulation, or how such decisions shape the precise boundaries of a firm. That
task was left to Williamson and other scholars, who sought to explain the
structure of market actors as well as how their behavior is affected by their
institutional setting.74 Williamson set out a theory of "transaction cost economiz-
ing," where, based on several critical dimensions of transactions (such as asset
specificity, which is the degree to which investments specific to a proposed
transaction have to be made in order to realize least cost supply), 75 a firm will
decide whether to, for example, make a product's components itself, buy them
from an autonomous supplier, engage in a joint venture, or pursue some other
arrangement that could alter the firm's boundary.76 The "efficient boundary" of
a firm is defined as core production plus "additional stages for which own
69. Ronald Coase, The New Institutional Economics, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 72, 73 (1998).
70. See, e.g., OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITtONS OF CAPITALSM 85-162 (1985).
71. See NEIL K. KoMEsAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAw, ECONOMICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 3-13, 53-150 (1994).
72. Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1661, 1672 (1989).
73. See Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 718-19.
74. Williamson also criticized Coase's treatment of the firm as tautological: "[T]ransaction costs are
appropriately made the center piece of the analysis, but these are not operationalized in a fashion that
permits one to assess the efficacy of completing transactions as between firms and markets in a
systematic way." OLrVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICA-
TIONS 3 (1975).
75. WILIAMsoN, supra note 70, at 41-42.
76. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87
AM. J. Soc. 548, 555-57, 561 (1981). See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 85-162.
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supply can be shown to be the efficient choice. 7 7 His model was used to
illustrate a choice between firm and market governance, and Williamson kept
much of his attention on these and other "alternative governance structures-
both within and between firms and markets. 78 New institutional economics has
had a profound and growing influence over legal scholarship.7 9
New institutional economics was enriched by two behavioral assumptions.
Williamson noted that although lawyers and economists are well aware of the
transaction costs that stem from complex contracts that are costly to write and
enforce, there was scant attempt to figure out why such contracting is costly to
begin with or how to remedy it. Two behavioral sources of high transaction
costs presented themselves to Williamson: "the recognition that human agents
are subject to bounded rationality" and "the assumption that at least some
agents are given to opportunism." 80 Contracting is inevitably incomplete on
account of these aspects of the human condition. The ability to make rational
decisions is limited by the information parties receive and their capacity to
process and share that information. 81 Faced with a limited ability to process
(receive, store, retrieve, and transmit) information, individuals turn to institu-
tions to simplify and regularize their complex surroundings-they establish
settled expectations, decision making heuristics, and other "intendedly rational"
ways of reducing complexity.82 They do not identify and negotiate every
possible contingency to a transaction, given time, resource, and cognitive
constraints. Complete contracting is therefore impossible. Still, Williamson
showed that even boundedly rational parties could comprehensively contract if
they were not given to strategic behavior.83 If parties were fully trustworthy,
"[p]rincipals would simply extract promises from agents that they would behave
in the manner of steward when unanticipated events occurred, while agents
would reciprocally ask principals to behave in good faith.",84 But once one or
more parties distorts information, hides issues, or disguises preferences, compre-
hensive contracting breaks down.
77. Williamson, supra note 76, at 557.
78. Id. at 552; see also WILLIAMSON, supra note 74, at 8-10 (describing firms and markets as
"alternative instruments for completing a related set of transactions" and setting out to determine the
factors that contribute to a decision to rely on one or the other governance structure).
79. See, e.g., COASEAN ECONOMICS: LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
(Steven G. Medema ed., 1998); Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace ofIdeas, 57 Durra L.J.
821 (2008); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institutional Economics, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000); Todd J. Zywicki, Institutions, Incentives, and Consumer Bankruptcy
Reform, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1071 (2005).
80. Williamson, supra note 76, at 553.
81. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 22-23
(1990); HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 93-97 (4th ed. 1997); WILLIAMSON, supra note 70,
at 133.
82. SIMON, supra note 81, at 88-89; WILLIAMSON, supra note 70, at 30-32.
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From points of market failure caused by bounded rationality and strategic
behavior, new institutional economics tries to learn how organizations strive to
govern economic relations more efficiently.86 Williamson credits John Com-
mons for his insight into the behavioral roots of transaction costs and why they
open the door for institutional effects.87 Specifically, the search for efficient
action, which calls for some degree of cooperation, will inevitably look beyond
the goal of aligning interests (rendered improbable by behavioral constraints) to
the invention of institutions that produce order out of conflict. Commons
defined institutions as the "working rules" within which individuals must
confine their activities if they are to avoid sanctions.88 North provided a more
fine-grained account of institutions, including formal (for example, laws and
rules) and informal constraints (for example, norms of behavior and self-
imposed codes of conduct) that can lead to increased coordination among
boundedly rational and potentially strategic individuals. 89 The conventional
understanding of institutions moved beyond Coase's sense of broader legal,
political, and social systems, or the institutions arrayed before us for compara-
tive analysis by law and economics scholars (courts, agencies, political bodies,
and markets), to include "not just law" but also a set of internal and external
rules that guide conduct and respond to transaction costs.90 North also departed
from Commons when he hinted that institutions arise for reasons other than
efficiency, noting that "at least the formal rules.., are created to serve the
interests of those with the bargaining power to create new rules." 9'
New institutional economics offers a behavioral-driven upgrade to standard
notions of utility maximizing found in law and economics. But decades after
publication of Social Cost, Coase sensed a continuing oversight in mainstream
economic theory: it does not show sufficient interest "in the internal arrange-
ments within organizations but only in what happens on the market, the
purchase of factors of production, and the sale of the goods that these factors
produce. 92 The notion of "institutions" has certainly flourished, to include
macro-level social arrangements 93 and micro-scale regularities in human interac-
tions (such as rules and norms),9 4 but the organizations engaged in contractual
86. See generally WLLAMSON, supra note 70; WILLIAMSON, supra note 74.
87. See WLLIUMON, supra note 74, at 3, 6.
88. COMMONS, supra note 56, at 6.
89. Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REv. 359, 360 (1994);
see NORTH, supra note 81, at 4, 57.
90. For example, a social norm such as "fair dealing" reduces transaction costs by "lessening the
need for formal contracting and enforcement mechanisms." Blocher, supra note 79, at 841. Ellickson
demonstrated that social norms are easier to enforce than legal sanctions. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
Wrroutr LAW 282-83 (1991).
91. North, supra note 89, at 360-61.
92. Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 714.
93. See North, supra note 89, at 359-60.
94. Id. at 360.
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negotiations, particularly firms, continue to be described as "black boxes. 95
Coase observed that "[t]his is very extraordinary given that most resources in a
modem economic system are employed within firms, with how these resources
are used dependent on administrative decisions and not directly on the operation
of a market.",96 To this oversight Williamson added what he considered the
absence of a sufficiently robust account of how transaction costs lead to the
formation of new institutions.97 These two oversights help explain the core of
the "incomplete institutionalism": its inadequate treatment of the reciprocal
nature of transaction costs.
We sense this incompleteness when we are asked to assume that because
transaction costs between a firm and multiple residents are prohibitively high, a
shift in the mode of property protection is in order. Our awareness is heightened
when we are told that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act98 or an emissions trading program is a "generator of high
transaction costs" but hear little about the organizations working to enact the
statute or program.99 The incomplete institutionalism of these and other assess-
ments overlooks how institutions, such as routines and standard operating
procedures, can emerge and (a) alter the mix of transaction costs that arise as
organizations make decisions and reach agreements and (b) apart from their
intended use to regularize activity and ensure more efficient coordination, lead
to greater inefficiency of exchange.
Absent a more complete account of institutions and their effect on transaction
costs, the predictions of law and economics scholars cluster around one of
Williamson's behavioral assumptions-the strategic behavior of parties-while
ignoring the other, namely their bounded rationality. We formulate predictions
for patterns of transaction costs that are due to strategic behavior, including free
rider, holdout, bilateral monopoly, and monitoring and enforcing agreements,'0°
while institutions to address the limits of human cognition continue to emerge
within organizations and affect decision making in ways that are less appreci-
ated.
95. Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 714; HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTrTUTONAL ECONOM-
ics 4 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
96. Coase, Institutional Structure, supra note 11, at 714.
97. Williamson, supra note 25, at 597.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
99. Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 8, at 76-79.
100. One widely cited study of nuisance theory noted the conventional understanding of strategic
behaviors, from "[holding] out for a disproportionate share of the gains from trade or [freeloading] on
the deal made by others" to withholding private information and "[wasting] time and money trying to
extract a large share of the gains from trade" in a bilateral monopoly situation. Farnsworth, supra note
24, at 378; see CooTER & ULEn, supra note 8, at 175; A. MrTCHELL POUIJSKY, INTRODUCTnON TO LAW AND
EcONOMICS 18 (1989); POsNR, supra note 5, at 62-63; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1027 (1995); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105
YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1995); Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 767; Polinsky, supra note 15, at 1092;
Schlag, supra note 72, at 1673.
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Law and economics has moved from Coase's rejection of the neoclassical
view of markets as costless pursuit of self-interest1 ' to models of purposeful
attempts to regularize interactions and respond to transaction costs. To this we
must add an account of the effects of institutions, particularly those that arise
within or are adopted by firms, on transaction costs, including the ability of
parties to bargain effectively over property rights. Just as legal scholars have
begun to account for the effects of cognitive biases (such as the -endowment
effect) on individuals,10 2 other scholars, legislators, and firms would benefit
from a similar appreciation of the cognitive limits of organizational actors.
Whether purposefully introduced or formed silently as background understand-
ings, the limiting effects of institutions on how actors within a firm process
information and make decisions add further friction to bargaining over environ-
mental protection. 103 These transaction costs remove much of the potential
efficiency of bargaining before it even begins. Accounting for only unitary
actors, their strategic behavior, and corrections for cognitive biases among
individuals will fail to predict how organizations bargain or how groups of
organizations respond to changes in the law.
D. ORGANIZATION THEORY: CONFRONTING INCOMPLETE INSTITUTIONALISM
Organization theory' ° has opened the black box of the kinds of firms and
agencies that bargain over entitlements. It provides tools for analyzing institu-
tions that are lacking in law and economics. Institutions are the inevitable
outcome of boundedly rational actors trying to make sense of the organizations
in which they work. Thus, organization theory shares an appreciation for
bounded rationality' 0 5 with new institutional economics and it locates the
constraint even more centrally in its analysis. But there is a marked difference
in how organization theory explains the growth and change of institutions. New
institutional economics predicts change in institutions when economic condi-
101. See Coase, supra note 69, at 72.
102. See supra note 24.
103. These dynamics can be studied in informal organizations as well as public agencies. See, e.g.,
Gregg P. Macey & Lawrence Susskind, The Secondary Effects of Environmental Justice Litigation: The
Case of West Dallas Coalition for Environmental Justice v. EPA, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 438-41
(2001).
104. This Article focuses on the work of a single branch within organization theory, namely what
Powell and DiMaggio refer to as "neoinstitutionalism." See, e.g., ScoTt, supra note 33; Paul J.
DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEw INSTITIYrIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 22, at 1, 12; James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism: Organizational
Factors in Political Uafe, 78 Am. POL. ScL REv. 734 (1984); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan,
Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 A. J. Soc. 340 (1977);
Lynne G. Zucker, The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural Persistence, 42 Am. Soc. REv. 726 (1977).
105. See Simon, supra note 81, at 88-89. See generally RIcHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARcH, A
BEHA vIoRAL THEORY OF TmW FIRM (1963); JAMES G. MARCH & JOHAN P OLSEN, AMaIGurrY AND CHOICE IN
ORGANI AnONs (1976); JAMES G. MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMoN, ORGANZATIONS (1958); Michael D.
Cohen, James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADsmIN.
Sci. Q. 1 (1972).
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tions lead to market failures or shifts in relative prices, which means gains from
adopting new arrangements may exceed the costs of any necessary collective
action. 106 Institutions are viewed as "problem-solving devices that actors use to
induce stability, contain opportunism, and realize gains from cooperation or
trade." 10 7 In contrast, organization theorists treat the behavior of a firm as a
response not just to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures (for
example, from regulatory agencies, actions of other firms, or internal rules).' 0 8
Efficiency is not the driving force behind decision making, nor is the formal
structure of a firm merely the result of rational adaptations to market conditions,
as elaborated by Williamson. In fact, formal structure itself is treated as
irrational.' 09
Organizations" 0 find themselves adrift in a sea of institutions, which we can
define broadly as "socially shared patterns of behavior or thought."'' They
include the "taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and classifications" E12 that "iden-
tify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relation-
ships." 1 3 Institutions serve as templates for actions that are considered
appropriate or legitimate, and "set bounds on rationality by restricting the
opportunities and alternatives we perceive and, thereby, increase the probability
of certain types of behaviour."' 1 4 Organizations are constantly looking to one
another, the state, and the professions for clues about how to structure their
operations, 115 and this process takes many of the routines adopted by an
organization and diffuses them across an industry or field, 116 again for reasons
106. Jack Knight, Explaining the Rise of Neoliberalism: The Mechanisms of Institutional Change, in
THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYsis 27-50 (John L. Campbell & Ove K.
Pederson eds., 2001).
107. Marc Schneiberg, Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional Change in Ameri-
can Property Insurance, 20 Soc. F. 93, 99 (2005).
108. Royston Greenwood & C.R. Hinings, Understanding Radical Organizational Change: Bring-
ing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism, 21 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 1022, 1025 (1996).
109. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 104, at 13.
110. It is important to distinguish organizations from institutions. An organization is a social
collective with a "goal of survival and self-perpetuation, ... more clearly defined, demarcated, and
defended boundaries, and often... [a] formal relationship with the state that recognizes [its] existence
as [a] distinct social entit[y]." JEFFaEY PFEFFER, NEW DmECrlONS FOR ORGANIZATION THEORY: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECrS 9 (1997). Institutions operate at a number of levels, including that of organizations,
subsystems within organizations, and broader organizational fields. ScoTr, supra note 33, at 55-60.
111. David Dequech, Institutions and Norms in Institutional Economics and Sociology, 40 J. ECON.
IssuEs 473, 477 (2006).
112. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 104, at 15. These and other means of expressing institutional-
ized expectations, including rules, standard operating procedures, and blueprints for action, were the
focus of Meyer and Rowan's groundbreaking work on the subject. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note
104, at 341-43.
113. Stephen R. Barley & Pamela S. Tolbert, Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the
Links Between Action and Institution, 18 ORG. STUD. 93, 96 (1997).
114. Id. at94.
115. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. Soc. REV. 147, 150-54 (1983).
116. See, e.g., Isin Guler, Mauro F Guilldn & John Muir Macpherson, Global Competition,
Institutions, and the Diffusion of Organizational Practices: The International Spread of 1SO 9000
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
over and above the technical efficiency of the routines.
The driving force behind institutions in this branch of organization theory is
not efficiency but legitimation.1 1 7 There is a strong degree of uncertainty in
decision making within a firm: legal rules are unclear, technologies are un-
proven, and means-ends relationships require a considerable degree of guess-
work.' 8 In response, firms adopt routines, standard operating procedures, and
other institutions from what are viewed as legitimate models in their regulatory
and competitive environments."1 9 At the same time, personnel operating within
firms, whose fundamental need is to reduce uncertainty (not to raise efficiency),
adopt their own sets of unwritten rules for dealing with bounded rationality.
Uncertainty is addressed through routines that direct limited attention to select
elements of problems faced by the firm.
12 0
All of these institutions are subject to replication. The state acts to force firms
to adopt certain forms or obey certain policies, professions suggest normative
standards for the activities over which they hold monopolies, and actors within
firms imitate strategies used elsewhere that appear successful. 121 As a result,
there are strong reciprocal exchanges between a firm (or other organization) and
the field in which it operates. Institutional formation flows in either direction.
The reciprocal nature of institutional formation has been identified in a number
of industries and regulatory activities, including accounting, 122 property insur-
ance,1 23 steel manufacturing, 124 chemical processing,
1 25 government audits, 126
and ISO 9000 quality certification. 127 Here, I focus on the behavior of regulated
firms.
Organization theorists gravitate toward definitions of institutions that are in
line with Simon's work on bounded rationality, focusing on scripts, rules, and
Quality Certificates, 47 ADMIN. So. Q. 207, 207-08 (2002); Andrew J. Hoffman, Institutional Evolution
and Change: Environmentalism and the U.S. Chemical Industry, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 351, 352 (1999).
117. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 104, at 343; Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic
and Institutional Approaches, 20 AcAD. MGMI. REV. 571, 571 (1995); Michael Vandenbergh, The
Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 2029, 2074 (2005).
118. See Cohen, March & Olsen, supra note 105, at 1.
119. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 115, at 150-54.
120. See SIMON, supra note 81, at 88.
121. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 115, at 150-54.
122. Greenwood & Hinings, supra note 108, at 1027; Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to
Institutional Processes, 16 AcAD. OF MGMT. REv. 145, 164-67 (1991).
123. Schneiberg, supra note 107, at 120-25.
124. Witold J. Henisz & Andrew Delios, Uncertainty, Imitation, and Plant Location: Japanese
Multinational Corporations 1990-1996, 46 AMNuN. So. Q. 443, 466-69 (2001); Harland Prechel,
Irrationality and Contradiction in Organizational Change: Transformation in the Corporate Form of a
U.S. Steel Corporation, 32 Soc. Q. 423, 428-40 (1991).
125. Hoffman, supra note 116, at 354-66.
126. Onker N. Basu, Mark W. Dirsmith & Parveen P. Gupta, The Coupling of the Symbolic and the
Technical in an Institutionalized Context: The Negotiated Order of the GAO's Audit Reporting Process,
64 Am. Soc. REv. 506, 522-23 (1999); Parveen P. Gupta, Mark W. Dirsmith & Timothy J. Fogarty,
Coordination and Control in a Government Agency: Contingency and Institutional Theory Perspectives
on GAO Audits, 39 AMIN. So. Q. 264, 277-80 (1994).
127. Guler, Guillrn & Macpherson, supra note 116, at 211-15, 223-29.
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classifications that through repeated use assume a taken-for-granted quality.128
By adopting institutions, the formal structure of an organization "dramatically
reflects the myths of [its] institutional environments instead of the demands of
[its] work activities."1 29 Examples abound of organizations that accommodate
institutional expectations even though they have little to do with efficiency.
Firms respond to pollution concentration standards by building taller smoke-
stacks, dispersing toxic chemicals across greater distances while ignoring produc-
tion inefficiencies and lost profits from capture and recycling.1 30 Regulatory
institutions lead organizations to create "formal safety rules, safety departments,
and safety programs" that are necessary to avoid sanction even if they engage in
very little rule enforcement.1 31 Monitoring and remediation institutions lead an
organization to adopt known yet ineffective solutions to PCB contamination.
132
And a refinery enacts a web of emergency response institutions, even as a lone
production unit covers neighboring homes in one hundred tons of neurotoxin
over a sixteen-day period.1 33 These examples of sanction-avoiding behavior are
inefficient from a social welfare standpoint in that they narrow the relationship
between compliance and the protection of human health and the environment.
What is apparent to observers of these and countless other vignettes is how
adopting institutions, often in a sincere attempt to hoist fragile flags of legiti-
macy for other firms and regulators to see, affects choices available to and
decisions made by a firm. Choice is constrained by institutional pressures. In
fact, strategic choice is often "preempted when organizations are unconscious
of, blind to, or otherwise take for granted the institutional processes to which
they adhere." 134 As more of an organization's structure is derived from institu-
tions, it adopts a "logic of confidence," exhibiting "elaborate displays of
confidence, satisfaction, and good faith" and enacting ceremonial inspection and
evaluation regimes. 135 Slowly, we sense a familiarity in the landscape as
organizational forms merge around the templates that available institutions
provide.
To understand how complex organizations (such as firms or agencies) bargain
or respond to new regulations, organization theory tells us to focus on the
institutional environments in which they are embedded.' 36 Institutions entail
128. DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 104, at 15.
129. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 104, at 341.
130. BRUCE A. AcKERmAn & WnLiAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoAL/DraY Am 23-24, 155, 161 (1981).
131. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 104, at 350.
132. LEE CLARKE, ACCEPrALE RjSK? MAKrNG DECISIONS IN A Toxic ENvIRONmENT 30-58 (1989).
133. Letter from Paul L. Schrader, Acting Chief Refinery Engineer, to Hossain Kazemi, Reg'l Water
Quality Control Bd., at 2 (Sept. 15, 1994) ("Estimated Quantity of Material Released"); see also infra
Part 1I.
134. Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 AcAD. OF Morr. REv. 145,
146, 148 (1991).
135. Meyer & Rowan, supra note 104, at 350-51, 358-59.
136. See Walter W. Powell, Institutional Effects on Organizational Structure and Performance, in
INsTIrtmONAL PATrERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS: CULTURE AND ENvIRO ma 115, 115-16 (Lynne G. Zucker
ed., 1988).
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sunk costs, taken-for-granted cognitive frames, and privileged means of prob-
lem solving. 137 Actors inside an organization are subject to pressures to conform
to typical practices from their peers, regulators, professions, and other sources.
Feedback from these sources constrains problem solving. Individuals are left to
pursue "incremental change, extensions of existing logics, or hybrids" of ap-
proaches that are already on hand. 138 The primary question asked at a moment
of crisis, such as an industrial accident, is quite different from those asked by
new institutional economists, who focus on conditions that give firms incentives
to adopt structural innovations such as vertical integration. Organization theo-
rists ask how the legitimacy or taken-for-granted character of institutions is
reinforced or subverted.
One of the most accessible models for studying how institutions affect the
costs of decision making emerged from studies of how firms adopt new
technologies. 139 Scholars analyze how technologies such as e-mail or medical
equipment affect the properties of firms and social service providers.1 40 They
model the dynamic process by which boundedly rational actors interact with the
institutional properties of their organization. This reciprocal interaction is ob-
served as individuals, particularly in situations that deviate from "normal"
operating conditions, "draw on existing stocks of knowledge, resources, and
norms to perform their work." '41 These efforts lead to new patterns of interac-
tion and standardized practices (for example, new roles and responsibilities,
modes of decision making, and approaches to learning). 142 The habitual use of
these new practices leads to their institutionalization. 113
The process is reciprocal because actors draw upon certain institutional
properties in their ongoing interactions, which in turn strengthens and reinforces
existing institutions.'44 In short, the institutions in which we operate are "both a
product of and a constraint on human action., 1 45 From this level of abstraction,
we can quickly move to a Boomer-like setting and consider how, for example, a
petrochemical plant's response to an accident or change in the law will reinforce
137. Schneiberg, supra note 107, at 103.
138. Id.
139. See Wanda J. Orlikowski, The Duality of Technology: Rethinking the Concept of Technology in
Organizations, 3 ORG. Sci. 398, 409 (1992).
140. For examples of studies exploring these effects, see Stephen R. Barley, Technology as an
Occasion for Structuring: Evidence from Observations of CT Scanners and the Social Order of
Radiology Departments, 31 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 78 (1986); Laura J. Black, Paul R. Carlile & Nelson P.
Repenning, A Dynamic Theory of Expertise and Occupational Boundaries in New Technology Implemen-
tation: Building on Barley's Study of CT Scanning, 49 ADMIN. Sc. Q. 572 (2004); Wanda J. Orlikowski,
Using Technology and Constituting Structures: A Practice Lens for Studying Technology in Organiza-
tions, 11 ORG. Sci. 404 (2000); Wanda J. Orlikowski, JoAnne Yates, Kazuo Okamura & Masayo
Fujimoto, Shaping Electronic Communication: The Metastructuring of Technology in the Context of
Use, 6 ORG. Scl. 423 (1995).
141. Orlikowski, supra note 139, at 411.
142. See id. at 404-05.
143. Id. at 406.
144. Barley & Tolbert, supra note 113, at 99-103.
145. Id. at 97.
[Vol. 98:863
COASEAN BLIND SPOTS
existing institutions, leading to new sources of transaction costs for bargaining
and regulation.
Barley and Tolbert's model begins with existing institutions,1 46 representing
blueprints of behavior that accumulate through prior interactions in the form of
rules, roles, and categories. This institutional realm constrains and enables
human action by (a) directing how problems are interpreted and work is carried
out, (b) influencing how resources are deployed to control what work gets done,
and (c) sanctioning particular sets of norms of what is and is not viewed as
acceptable practice. 147 There is also a realm of action-the people, objects, and
events that emerge as a social setting unfolds. 48 How do the two realms
interact? Institutions are encoded in actors' existing knowledge as interpretive
schemas. 14 9 Individuals make use of these "scripts," 150 or outlines of recurrent
patterns of interaction,15' and in so doing the scripts allow the institutional
realm to shape how people communicate, use power, and sanction some behav-
iors while rewarding others.'
5 2
The concept of "script" was developed to explain how individuals manage
their daily activities and reduce the costs of responding to situational stimuli.1
5 3
When we enter a social situation, we recall frameworks that depict "events or
behaviors.., appropriate for [that] particular context."'154 These scripts impose
order on ensuing interactions and allow us to make sense of our environment
despite our limited cognitive capacity. They set out "a typical sequence of
occurrences in a given situation,"' 15 5 including the turns, roles, and categories of
acts that outline how it will unfold. 156 Because we cannot process all of the
146. Id.; see also ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTTU-TON OF SOcIETY 25-29 (1984) (discussing how
social structures and institutions are reproduced over time and analyzed through the prior experiences
of social actors).
147. See Barley & Tolbert, supra note 113, at 97-98.
148. Id.
149. GarDENs, supra note 146, at 28-29.
150. Defined as "observable, recurrent activities and patterns of interaction characteristic of a
particular setting," scripts are the means through which individual practices and understandings
accumulate and set conditions for future action. Barley & Tolbert, supra note 113, at 98. They have
been defined elsewhere as "routines" or "schemata," but in each case the concepts represent similar
phenomena. See Martha S. Feldman & Brian T. Pentland, Reconceptualizing Organizational Routines
as a Source of Flexibility and Change, 48 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 96, 97-98 (2003); Andrew Hargadon &
Angelo Fanelli, Action and Possibility: Reconciling Dual Perspectives of Knowledge in Organizations,
13 ORG. Sci. 290, 293 (2002).
151. Barley, supra note 140, at 83.
152. Id. at 82-84.
153. Scripts are based on the notion that cognition is "embedded," or emerges as individuals interact
with their environment. Bart Nooteboom, Elements of a Cognitive Theory of the Firm, 9 ADVANCES iN
AusTRiAN ECON. 145, 149 (2007). See Paul J. Heald & James E. Heald, Mindlessness and Law, 77 VA.
L. REv. 1127, 1143-1151 (1991).
154. Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 AcAD. OF MGmr. REV.
449,450 (1984).
155. Blake E. Ashforth & Yitzhak Fried, The Mindlessness of Organizational Behaviors, 41 HUM.
REL. 305, 306 (1988).
156. Barley, supra note 140, at 83.
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information embedded in our surroundings, we rely on models of behavior and
event sequences viewed as appropriate in the settings where we find ourselves.
An early account of script formation suggests the following steps: (a) an
individual creates a mental representation of an element of observed behavior;
(b) the cognitive representation serves as a guide for the observer's performance
of the behavior; (c) the behavior is carried out in response to situational cues;
and (d) the representation is internalized through explanation, rehearsal, and
repetition, leading to its retention in semantic memory. 157 Once in place, scripts
add structure to ambiguous tasks and conserve scarce cognitive resources.
The importance of scripts increases, as both guide to behavior and unit of
analysis, as actions become more coordinated. Such is the case in organizations,
where the interdependence of roles and activities calls for greater agreement
among actors over how best to proceed. 58 Within organizations, individuals
must arrive at shared meanings and ways of interpreting their surroundings in
order to achieve common purposes. For this reason, a firm's behavior is
dominated by routine task performance and role-based interaction,1 59 which
encourage agreement and the integrated actions that characterize an organiza-
tion. But although scripts facilitate, predict, and legitimize interdependent behav-
ior, they also develop their own constituencies and sunk costs. Through repetition,
they become removed from the context that called for their initial use and are
taken for granted, thus reducing a firm's ability to respond to change. Studies of
technological disasters provide a number of examples of facility managers and
production workers who mistakenly interpret clues of an impending crisis as
consistent with available scripts, rely on fewer feedback mechanisms because of
existing scripts, or escalate their commitment to scripts under moments of
stress. 169 Thus, although scripts initially allow firms to adopt new institutions to
resolve matters of efficiency, they can, in predictable ways, lead to departures
from effective decision making. At the same time, it is encouraging for the
regulation of internal firm practices that scripts are amenable to feedback and
revision. 
161
To study the social order of an organization, Barley and others focus on
"behavioral scripts," observable streams of behavior that are set in motion when
cognitive scripts are activated.' 61 For example, Barley catalogued behavioral
scripts to investigate the effects of newly acquired CT scanning technology on
the performance of radiology departments. 163 The departments operated accord-
157. Dennis A. Gioia & Charles C. Manz, Linking Cognition and Behavior: A Script Processing
Interpretation of Vicarious Learning, 10 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 527, 532 (1985).
158. Ashforth & Fried, supra note 155, at 308.
159. id. at 315.
160. Id. at 316-19; see, e.g., THOMAS D. BEAMISH, SILENT SPILL: THE ORGANIZATION OF AN INDUSTRIAL
CRISIS 46-50, 73-77 (2002).
161. Robert G. Lord & Mary C. Kernan, Scripts as Determinants of Purposeful Behavior in
Organizations, 12 AcAD. OF MGMT. Rav. 265, 274 (1987).
162. Barley, supra note 140, at 85-86; Gioia & Poole, supra note 154, at 456-57.
163. Barley, supra note 140, at 84-86.
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ing to unique sets of interaction sequences that shifted once the new scanners
were introduced. One behavioral script, "clandestine teaching," was performed
by radiologists who did not understand how the CT scanners worked. Through
performance of the script, the physicians sought information in a way that
allowed technologists to correct them without questioning their relative status.
The clandestine teaching script included three categories of acts and two
different role categories interacting in the following sequence:
(a) Radiologist asks an irrelevant question or makes a faulty suggestion;
(b) Technologist provides information correcting the faulty information; and
(c) Radiologist adjusts his or her claim to align it with standard protocol.
64
Each behavioral script enacts a cognitive script in response to situational cues. It
gives us clues as to the underlying mental representations that guide behavior in
an organization and that over time can lock in a variety of institutional influ-
ences. Scripts are identified and catalogued through participant observation or
content analysis of archival records.1 65 A sample is taken of all interaction
episodes that occur in a social context between predetermined breakpoints, such
as a period of time before and after an exogenous event or a shift in organiza-
tional strategy. 166 Parties are identified and behavioral scripts are mapped
according to which parties interact, in what ways, sharing what kinds of
information, and at what times. Actors' immediate interpretations of events are
also elicited. From these data, categories of actors and the respective roles,
actions, and turns that reveal the essential plot of a script are outlined.
167
An example of a script in the environmental management context comes from
the Unocal refinery discussed in Part II.A. Engineers and process foremen at the
facility can be observed telling operators what chemicals to add to an ongoing
process in order to keep a refinery unit operational. One common behavioral
script includes the following turns:
(a) Operator monitors an indicator for "feed gas gravity," a parameter that
represents the amount of hydrocarbon to be reformed into hydrogen and
carbon monoxide in the D-409 unit;
(b) When the feed gas gravity indicator increases above a certain amount,
Operator informs the Process Foreman; and
(c) Operator adds potassium hydroxide to the unit until the indicator falls
within an acceptable range.
168
164. Id. at 91-92.
165. Id. at 81, 84-86; Gioia & Poole, supra note 154, at 456-57.
166. Barley, supra note 140, at 82.
167. Id. at 85-86.
168. See MACEY, supra note 47, at ch. 4 (manuscript on file with author).
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This script embodies an institutionalized response to crisis, represented in this
example by a potentially unstable refinery unit. The head operator explained
that during unit instability, "it's the wrong time to be asking why. Things are
moving too fast and you have to stay on top of things. You run the unit; don't let
the unit run you." '169 The above script focused operators on the task of stabiliz-
ing parameters, which they interpreted as necessary to avoid unit shutdown
(extreme levels of instability can trigger automatic shutoff). 170 In response to a
situational cue (parameter increase), operators viewed their role as reversing
instability and "running the unit," which included deferring to the process
foreman and adding one or more chemicals to the solution. Their role did not
include monitoring for accidental emissions. Asking questions or raising counter-
factuals, such as the possibility that certain indicators can increase dramatically
when there is not enough Catacarb to absorb the carbon dioxide in the system,
was not viewed as an acceptable role for a D-409 operator.171 The decision to
add potassium hydroxide to the mixture or increase the unit's stripping steam,
so that operators could keep the unit from "running them," actually increased
the amount of Catacarb released during an accident at the facility, even as unit
indicators remained stable. 
172
Institutions, which are imported from a firm's organizational field (including
regulators, competitors, and trade associations) in the form of rules, roles, and
categories of behavior, are encoded in scripts and shared by social actors
through repeated interaction.1 73 There are four means by which the realms of
institution and action interact within an organization. 174 In Barley and Tolbert's
model, vertical motion represents institutional constraints while diagonal mo-
tion represents maintenance or change of an institution through action. The four
means of interaction are as follows:
a. Encoding: Institutional principles are encoded in scripts, as organizational rules
and procedures are internalized, appropriate behaviors are interpreted, and techni-
cal designs force actors to engage in certain patterns of activity.
b. Enactment: Actors follow scripts, using standardized rationales when they
are aware that they are doing so, but often following them without aware-
ness of their origin.
c. Revision or Replication: Events such as technological shifts, market
adjustments, and contacts across organizations can lead to modifications of





173. Karan Sonpar, Jay M. Handelman, & Ali Dastmalchian, Implementing New Institutional Logics
in Pioneering Organizations: The Burden of Justifying Ethical Appropriateness and Trustworthiness, 90
J. OF Bus. Evmcs 345, 348 (2009).
174. Barley & Tolbert, supra note 113, at 100-03.
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sents the outcome of a previous negotiation, there will be actors who will
resist reopening those deliberations to collective questioning.
d. Externalization: Following replication or revision, patterned behaviors or
scripts are separated from specific actors or circumstances. From this point,
scripts become more difficult to identify, isolate, and criticize, as their
relationship to the interests of individual actors becomes less clear.175
Interactions between each stage are illustrated in Figure 1.
Institutions
a /d _ _
Scri Pts critsatT2t TcitsatT3
b/c
Action
Figure 1. Sequential Model of Institutional Formation.
176
The cycling of scripts occurs as firms are engaged in normal operations as
well as when they react to a crisis or regulatory intervention. Although initially
scripts may be adopted for efficiency reasons, over time they can become less
compatible with the contexts in which they are performed. This dynamic limits
an organization's ability to respond to change or consider more effective modes
of operation. By peering inside organizations and identifying the scripts that
lead them to reject better outcomes while upholding practices that deviate from
efficiency, we can account for a wide range of behavior, such as how firms
bargain over property entitlements and enact new regulations.
II. BARGAINING IN AN INSTITUTIONALIZED SETTING: TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE
INSTITUTIONALISM
A. RITUALS AND SCRIPTS: THE CASE OF AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
We can often trace events leading to environmental bargaining to an indus-
trial accident. When an accident occurs at a place such as the Unocal Corpora-
tion's San Francisco Refinery, a series of scripts are set in motion. Risk
management proceeds according to distinct ritualistic acts by government and
175. Id.
176. Id. at 100-03 & fig.2.
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industry officials. For example, in 1994, the refinery released an estimated one
hundred tons or more of Catacarb into the air over sixteen days before managers
decided to shut down the responsible unit.177 Unocal's description of the
"Catacarb incident" confidently displays how the appropriate parties were
contacted, procedures undertaken, and data (post-accident monitoring, model-
ing, and sampling) collected. Yet it offers few details of what transpired during
the sixteen-day accident. 1
78
Unocal's chronology of events begins on August 22 at 0655 hours ("time
reported") and 0720 hours ("time CCC HSD notified"). 179 The leak was de-
clared "under control" at 0945 hours and "all clear" the following day. 180 The
accounts skip ahead to September, outlining calls from residents starting on
September 4 (0925 hours) and 5 (0120 hours) and agency notifications begin-
ning September 6 to the Bay Area Air Quality Management District.18 ' There is
an air of control and predictability to such organizational accounts of acci-
dents.182 But there are, behind the human errors and incentives commonly used
to explain industrial accidents, 183 a series of scripts that constrain choice and
lead organizations such as Unocal to make inefficient decisions.
I analyzed refinery worker depositions taken as part of a toxic tort claim filed
on behalf of residents affected by the spill. 8 4 I identified the scripts that
allowed the Catacarb release to continue for two weeks after it was discovered.
One set of scripts guided accident investigation, a complex process at a facility
spanning hundreds of acres and thousands of emissions points. Shortly after the
Catacarb leak was discovered, hydrotreating engineer Ellen Barker started a
formal investigation of the leak by drafting a Management of Change (MOC)
177. Memorandum from the Dir. of Enforcement, Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Unocal
Refinery, to the Air Pollution Control Officer (Sept. 23, 1994) (on file with author).
178. See Unocal Corp. San Francisco Refinery, Catacarb Release Fact Sheet (no date); see also
MACEY, supra note 47, at ch. 4 (manuscript on file with author).
179. Post Incident Analysis, L. Miller, Fire Protection Department (Aug. 31, 1994).
180. Id.
181. See Unocal Corp. San Francisco Refinery, supra note 178; Letter from Paul L. Schrader, Acting
Chief Refinery Engineer, to Dir. of Enforcement, Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. (Sept. 22, 1994)
("On August 22, 1994, while under normal operating conditions, the D-409 Regenerator Tower
developed a leak to the atmosphere in the upper section of the tower.... Some time after September 2,
1994, conditions in the tower changed ... ").
182. Montgomery Watson, Sampling and Analysis Plan for the September 1994 Catacarb Release,
Unocal San Francisco Refinery, at 1 (Sept. 1994) ("On Tuesday, September 6, 1994, Unocal personnel
at the Unocal San Francisco Refinery (SFR), located in the city of Rodeo, California, determined that a
solution with the trade name of Catacarb was being released in the form of a mist from the D-409 ....
The plant was shut down and regulatory agencies were contacted .....
183. PERow, supra note 40, at 67.
184. Transcripts of twenty-one depositions of refinery workers were coded for worker activities, decisions,
and actions during the two-week accident Their actions were then divided into themes, which guided a second
review of their depictions of the accident. Each theme represents an area of activity or organizational design
responsible in part for the extension of the leak at the refinery. Acting in combination, the themes represent the
root causes of the severity of the Catacarb release and its effects on neighboring communities. See, e.g.,
Transcript of Deposition of Stephen Plesh, General Manager, Unocal San Francisco Refinery, In re Unocal
Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 1996).
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proposal. The need for an MOC was justified by the fact that the tower leak was
"not a typical situation [and] operational changes outside of design should be
reviewed." 185 The MOC Work Request was made because the refinery was
"operating at outside of its established design limits, because we normally don't
have a vent on the side of the tower."1 86 Under an MOC, review of available
Material Safety Data Sheets, review by the Health, Safety, and Emergency
Response Department, structural integrity review of the tower, environmental
review, and Process Hazard Analysis (HAZOP), which contains a matrix of pressures,
temperatures, flows, and concentrations under a variety of scenarios (relating to
increases, decreases, and unit shutdown) are carried out. 18 7 The HAZOP team
has the authority to recommend shutdown or repair. Instead, management
determined that an MOC was not necessary because "[iut was a change in
operation, but it wasn't something that we installed to change the operation.''
1 88
In its place, a Process Review was commissioned, finding the operation stable
and "[e]verything appeared to be operating in normal... parameter ranges."
' 189
This review focused entirely on operational issues; no consideration was given
to health or safety risks unrelated to general operation of the unit.
Procedures were in place to identify Catacarb emissions from day one. A
second set of scripts governed how refinery workers monitored the Catacarb
leak. Table 1 is a compilation of the observations they recorded during the
accident.
One possible explanation for Catacarb's sporadic appearance in the monitor-
ing logs could be found in its tendency to form around a leak until bits of solid
Catacarb are blown free by the pressure behind them. 91 Another set of explana-
tions could be found in observation logs for operating parameters.1 92 But
185. Transcript of Deposition of Ellen Barker, Hydrotreating Engineer, Unocal San Francisco
Refinery, at 343, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 24, 1996).
186. Id. at 344.
187. Id. at 348-61; see id. at 378-79; Transcript of Deposition of Lanny Partain, Shift Supervisor,
Unocal San Francisco Refinery, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. May
23, 1996); UNOCAL PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND CHEMICALS DMsION, SAN FRANCISCO REFINERY, PROCESS
HAZARD ANALYSIS: UNICRACKING UNIT 240, HYDROGEN PRODUCTION SEcnON-PLANT 4 (Feb. 1994);
UNOCAL SAN FRANCISCO REFINERY, SAN FRANCISCO REFINERY PoLciES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL: MOC
AND PRE-STARTUP SAFETY REvEEw PROCEDURES (1994) (originally issued in 1992).
188. Transcript of Deposition of Russell Crawford, Superintendent of Hydrotreating, Unocal San
Francisco Refinery, at 77-78, 310-11, 327-30, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 19, 1996); see Letter from Randall L. Sawyer, Risk Mgmt. and Prevention Program
Specialist, Contra Costa County Health Servs. Dep't, to Warren A. Smith, Superintendent, Envtl.
Affairs, S.F. Refinery (Oct. 25, 1994) (expressing concerns over the failure to invoke a Management of
Change procedure); Transcript of Deposition of Stephen Plesh, supra note 184, at 263.
189. Transcript of Deposition of Ellen Barker, supra note 185, at 392-93; see also id. at 377-78
(stating that recollection of Process Review was that it was "an endorsement of continued operation").
190. Transcript of Deposition of Adrien Van de Hoef, Bulk Shift Supervisor, Unocal San Francisco
Refinery, at 20, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 1996).
191. Leak Observation Log, Hydrotreating Department (8/24/94-9/6/94) (Sept. 6, 1994) (emphasis
added).
192. For example, the amount of Catacarb escaping from the tower increased whenever operators
increased the amount of stripping steam, which helps with CO2 removal, in the tower. Transcript of
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Table 1. Monitoring Observations Recorded During Catacarb Accident.1 90
Date Comments
8/22 Blowing forcefully through insulation; Some catacarb leaking to ground level (3
pm); No change (7 pm); Blowing through insulation; Little or no catacarb leakage
(11 pm).
8/23 No change (3 am); No change (7 am); No change (3 pm); No change (7 pm);
No change (11 pm).
8/24 No change (3 am); Can't tell (8 am).
8/25 Blowing forcefully through insulation; Little or no catacarb leakage (3 am);
Getting worse (8 am); Same (12 pm); Steadily worsening: No liquid dripping
obviously but forceful steam plume (4 pm); Same (8 pm).
8/26 No change (12 am); No change (4 am); No change (8 am); No change (12 pm);
Same? (but catacarb visible in plume intermittently) (4 pm); Same? (perhaps odor
is more detectable behind D409); More spots on ground (8 pm).
8/27 Same as above (12 am); No change (4 am); Catacarb is starting to
accumulate on over head lines and equipment (8 am); Same as above. Still
accumulating on equipment, piping (12 pm); Continuing as noted above (4
pm); Continues (8 pm).
8/28 No change (12 am); No change (4 am); Still blowing catacarb. Catacarb probably
coming down side of D409 (8 am); Same (12 pm); It seems that the catacarb puffs
have stopped with no new catacarb on ground (4 pm); No change (8 pm).
8/29 No change (12 am); No change (4 am); Still blowing catacarb (8 am); Same
(12 pm); Slightly discolored cloud/plume blowing forcefully. Some wet
spots at base (4 pm); Continuing as noted above (8 pm).
8/30 Slight increase (12 am); Same (4 am); No change (8 am); No change (12 pm);
Same (4 pm); Continues (8 pm).
8/31 Same (12 am); No change (4 am); No change (8 am); No change (12 pm);
Continues (hole enlarged a bit) (4 pm); Continues (8 pm).
9/1 No change (12 am); Increased slightly (4 am); Same as above (8 am); Same as
above (12 pm).
9/2 Same (12 am); No change (4 am); Increased slightly (8 am); Same as above
(12 pm); Still blowing (4 pm); Still blowing (8 pm).
9/3 Blowing forcefully (12 am); Continues (4 am); No change (8 am); No change
(12 pm); Catacarb on the ground; hole seems bigger (4 pm); Still blowing
catacarb on equipment behind tower (8 pm).
9/4 Maybe it's just sinuses on midnight shift but I started sneezing and watering when
doing readings in area (12 am); Blowing forcefully, perhaps hole is enlarged (4 am);
Same as above (8 am); Same as above (12 pm); More noticeable catacarb on pipes
and equip. Very little steam in the cloud. Looks mainly like vaporized catacarb.
Hole looks bigger (4 pm--8 pm).
9/5 Fire monitor on D407--difficult to tell size of hole (12 am); Mist is definitely
brown. Since puddles and gutters are brown must be knocking some down from
mist (4 am); Leak still the same. Shut off fire hose per RM (8 am); With the increase
in steam, catacarb coming from the leak is more noticeable (12 pro-4 pm).
9/6 Blowing forcefully; Some operators complained got mist on windshields on
way to work (12 am); Blowing forcefully (4 am).
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because overlapping investigation, monitoring, and operating parameter scripts 1 9 3
crowded out or displaced such explanations and did not make them available to
management, a case for unit shutdown could not be made despite consensus that
the leak was more than "just steam and CO2 ." Other scripts that magnified the
scope of the accident included internal decision making and emergency re-
sponse scripts. 1
94
I identified similar scripts at the Rh6ne Poulenc and Conoco facilities using
internal documents and interviews with environmental managers. The scripts
cluster around four basic categories: (a) scripts governing how a facility re-
sponds to and reports accidents;1 95 (b) plant-level environmental management
scripts such as existing roles and standard operating procedures; 19 6 (c) regula-
tory response scripts that involve a predictable set of agendas, data gathering
Deposition of Gary Martin, Plant 4 Operator, Unocal San Francisco Refinery, at 124-32, In re Unocal
Refinery Litigation, No. 94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 1996). The period between September 1 and
2 when operators did not observe Catacarb in the plume coming out of the tower corresponds with an
unplanned shutdown elsewhere in the refinery that caused stripping steam rates to plummet. Transcript
of Deposition of Gary Martin, supra, at 82-83; Transcript of Deposition of Hamid Raza Arabzadeh,
Industrial Hygiene Manager, Unocal San Francisco Refinery, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No.
94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996); see also infra tbl 2. Transcript of Deposition of Diane Wang,
Senior Operator, Unocal San Francisco Refinery, at 96-99, In re Unocal Refinery Litigation, No.
94-04141 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996).
193. An observation log was kept during the accident, including entries for operating parameters that
management believed would allow workers to monitor the stability of the unit; loss of Catacarb was at
best a secondary consideration. See Transcript of Deposition of Russell Crawford, supra note 188, at
89, 100, 272-74. The entries were to be recorded so that the operators would "be able to notice a trend
and try to deal with it before it gets to a critical stage." Transcript of Deposition of Diane Wang, supra
note 192, at 163-65. Some of the variables could be linked to possible Catacarb loss. Transcript of
Deposition of Diane Wang, supra note 192, at 164, 187-88; Transcript of Deposition of Gary Martin,
supra note 192, at 55-57; see also Memorandum from K.C. Sadoian to R.A. Crawford (Aug. 24, 1994)
("To minimize the leak stripping steam to D-409 has been reduced by about 10%."); Memorandum
from E.C. Scherer to R.H. Ferneau (June 10, 1994) ("Normality-Solution strength affects CO 2
removal."). But because the readings in the log, when they were available for trend analysis, did not
necessarily point to Catacarb loss, the clearer objective to avoid catastrophic change prevailed.
Transcript of Deposition of Gary Martin, supra note 192; Transcript of Deposition of Hamid Raza
Arabzadeh, supra note 192; see also Transcript of Deposition of Diane Wang, supra note 192, at
171-73; Memorandum from M.L. Clark to All Operations Personnel and All Maintenance Personnel
(Sept. 2, 1994) ("It is possible that the leak will gradually grow in size (typical of a steam leak), but the
mechanical integrity of the tower is not in question."); Hydrotreating Department Unit 240 Night
Instructions (Aug. 22, 1994) ("There is a log sheet in the control room to be filled out every 4 hours. It
lists the H2 production, steam to D-409, D-408 delta temp., CO 2 slip and a visual description of the leak
itself. We have made the decision to run in this condition based on the last ME&I inspection, the
knowledge that if the leak gets worse, it will not just crack in half .... ").
194. For a complete overview of the Catacarb accident, see MACEY, supra note 47, at ch. 4
(manuscript on file with author).
195. See supra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
196. For example, Discharge Monitoring Reports that provide quantity and concentration figures for
parameters (substances) used each month at Rh6ne Poulenc (now Rhodia) showed only a narrow range
of lost products that, if captured, could be reprocessed and sold to various industries and suggested that
little could be done to change the facility's raw material feeds, which fluctuated according to the needs
of customers (refineries, carpet producers, and electroplaters). Interview with Environmental Profession-
als, Rhodia, in Manchester, Tex. (Apr. 23, 2002).
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exercises, and timetables;1 97 and (d) scripts embedded within the technologies
employed by each facility, particularly source reduction, pollution monitoring,
and risk regulation.' 98 These scripts embody the institutional context in which
accidents occur and parties engage in post-accident bargaining. Table 2 presents
major land uses in the communities adjacent to the Unocal, Rh6ne Poulenc, and
Conoco facilities and the categories of scripts that worsened the impact of each
accident, such as inadequate monitoring and early warning procedures, disaster
plans that met EPCRA standards but could not adequately protect residents,
safeguards and shutdown procedures that did not prevent the release of substan-
tial amounts of toxic emissions, and state-industry coordination of the interpreta-
tion of accidents.
Regulators ignore how scripts can magnify the intensity and duration of an
accident. The primary investigators of the Catacarb release were the Bay Area
Air Quality Management District (AQMD). The AQMD focused on public
nuisance and particulate weight and intensity limitations, issued civil penalties
accordingly, and called for extra training for certain individuals. 99 A consent
decree required changes to training initiatives and reductions in human error."°
Two easily reportable and verifiable actions-placement of a hygienist and
completion of training hours-marked the only efforts to address organizational
precursors to the incident.20 ' Thus, regulators ignored the most troubling con-
197. For example, emissions problems at the Conoco refinery led EPA Region VIII to overfile on
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) enforcement actions, claiming that
the state did not adequately interpret regulations concerning inspections, record keeping, hazardous
waste discharges, notices to the state, and penalties for RCRA violations. Complaint, Compliance Order
and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing, In re Conoco, Inc., No. RCRA (3008) VIII-97-03 (Mar. 18,
1997). At the same time, the state filed Compliance Advisories under RCRA and the Colorado
Hazardous Waste Act regarding benzene in one of Conoco's wells and groundwater contamination.
Compliance Order on Consent, In re Conoco, Inc., No. VII-98-03 (Aug. 7, 1998). A public interest
firm filed a citizen suit under section 304 of the Clean Air Act, focusing on inadequate emissions
monitoring. Complaint, CoPIRG Citizen Lobby v. Conoco, Inc., No. 98-30 (N.D. Colo. Jan. 8, 1998).
And Conoco adapted to a series of regulatory changes: for example, it sought to improve its control
over fugitive emissions and on-site continuous monitoring, two areas of concern addressed in subse-
quent consent orders with the Department of Justice. Telephone Interview with Air Program Leader,
Conoco Refinery (Mar. 22, 2001); Interview with Environmental Director, Conoco Refinery, in Com-
merce City, Colo. (Mar. 7, 2001).
198. Technology, such as the pollution monitoring system adopted as part of the Unocal agreement,
introduces its own set of expected behaviors and limitations of operation. See infra notes 220-25 and
accompanying text. Organization theorists have long posited that a new technology influences the
practices that are demanded by its use, which stabilize over time as new roles and responsibilities called
for by the technology become apparent. Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of
Facts and Artefacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit
Each Other, 14 Soc. STU. Sci. 399, 410-19 (1984). As a new technology is adopted, the distance
between the intentions of a technology's designers and the practices of its users grows as social
networks incompatible with the new technology are not disentangled by those who introduce the new
artifact. Id.
199. Consent Decree and Final Judgment, Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. Union Oil Co. of
Cal., No. C95-03165 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 1995).
200. Id.
201. See MACEY supra note 47.
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Table 2. Land Uses, Accidents, and Organizational Scripts at Case Study
Sites.
20 2
Unocal Rh6ne Poulenc Conoco
Affected Unincorporated towns Manchester, Smith North Denver
Communities (Crockett and Addition, Harrisburg communities
Rodeo), fenceline communities in (Swansea, Elyria)
communities (Bayo Houston, TX and Commerce
Vista and Tormey) City, CO
in Contra Costa, CA
Prominent Petroleum refinery, Petrochemical operations 150 industrial land
Industrial sugar refinery along Houston Ship uses, 4 NPL sites,
Land Uses Channel including 3 lead smelters,
Rh6ne Poulenc, numerous
Valero, Oxid, hazardous waste
Lyondell-Citgo, Mobil sites within 450
acres
Recent 2300 wastewater 2 sulfuric acid leaks, 16 incidents
Accidents discharge 1980 (Stauffer); involving SO2
violations, gasoline tank leak, releases,
1977-1989; approx. 1986; fire, 1988; oil 1995-1996
20 air episodes per tank explosion, 1990 (Conoco
year, 1992-1995 (Hill Chemical); refinery); HCL
numerous explosions release from








Extent of 16 day, 100 ton 30 plant workers sent to .02-113 tons
Accident release; serious hospital released per
injuries reported incident (16)
Implicated Internal decision Chemical transport/ Overlapping
Scripts making; accident offloading procedures; regulatory
investigation; visual release containment; responses; sulfur
monitoring; existing permits create reduction unit
organizational perceived limits to procedures;
memory; operating process changes and inspections;
parameter emissions reductions; record-keeping;
procedures; discharge monitoring; notices to State;
emergency off-site monitoring and lack of safeguards
response/warning information sharing to prevent,
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cern to emerge during the release: the fact that a heavily regulated, complex
facility encourages employees at all levels to adopt scripts, including routines
(for example, patterns of visual observation, information, or knowledge trans-
fer), rules (for example, only ask questions or share information under certain
circumstances), or means of framing questions (for example, internal decision
making) to simplify what is expected of both them and their coworkers during
an unexpected event.
B. BARGAINING EFFECTS OF SCRIPTS
The Catacarb accident began as Unocal sought a land use permit in response
to new rules issued by the California Air Resources Board. The rules required
motor fuel composition changes and modifications to the refineries that pro-
duced them.2 °3 A draft Environmental Impact Report for the project was issued
in June 1994.204 The county responded by conditioning permit approval on
Unocal's negotiating with residents over refinery conditions, 205 essentially giv-
ing residents of two incorporated towns (Rodeo and Crockett) and a public
housing development (Bayo Vista) a property rule protection against refinery
expansion and emissions increases that would only occur upon approval of the
permit. We would traditionally expect this and similar bargaining situations to
collapse under the weight of strategic realities when they involve an entitlement
held by multiple parties.2 °6
Yet time and again, residents overcome the kinds of positional bargaining
behaviors that are encouraged by, for example, a bilateral monopoly situation
(such as where negotiation with a set of communities is the only means to a
necessary permit and where the plant is the primary source of harm and,
therefore, potential improvement to an area's environmental quality). The good
neighbor agreement signed between residents and Unocal, the community audit
agreement reached by Manchester residents and Rh6ne Poulenc (which also led
to permit approval), and other contracts attest to a growing frequency of
agreements that return the entitlement to operate or expand a facility to the
polluting firm in exchange for financial and other contributions.
The mere fact of an agreement, which can be presented as a data point in
contravention of standard law and economics predictions, is less important than
202. Consent Decree & Final Judgment, supra note 199.
203. G.R. Hadder, Future Refining Impacts of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 17 ENERGY
857, 857 (1992); R.C. Sherr, G.A. Smalley & M.E. Norman, Clean Air Amendments Put Big Burden on
Refinery Planners, 23 On & GAS J. 35, 35-38 (1991).
204. CONRA COSTA CouNrTY, DRAFt ENvmRONamrAL IMPACr REPORT FOR THE UNOCAL CORPORATION
REFoaWULATED GASoLINE PRojrcr (LAND USE PERMrr 2038-93; STATE CLEARNGHOUSE # 93121027)
(1994); see also Statement of Findings and Overriding Considerations for the Union Oil Company of
California Reformulated Gasoline Project Land Use Permit Application #2038-93, Adopted by Contra
Costa County Board of Supervisors, at 3.
205. Contra Costa County Planning Commission, Community Development Agenda Item #6, Uno-
cal Corporation (Applicant and Owner) (Nov. 15, 1994).
206. See supra note 21.
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the nature of the agreement itself. When we open up the black box of organiza-
tions that negotiate over entitlements, we find a series of scripts that cause or
magnify the nuisances and toxic torts that lead communities to organize in
opposition to facilities. Unocal, Rhrne Poulenc, and Conoco are required to
comply with rules governing emissions points, input-output factors, fugitive
emissions, storage and shipment of waste products, monitoring, and analysis
and prevention of accidents. These requirements are superimposed on existing
efforts to maintain production. Similarly, agencies, lacking the ability to continu-
ously monitor or inspect even a small subset of existing sources, must make
tough decisions regarding how best to enforce the same regulations and ensure
compliance.
Both firms and regulators, faced with pressing demands and limited re-
sources, adopt a series of rule-like means of upholding the appearance that
regulations are producing desired effects. Regulators rely on industry emissions
estimates, scatter a limited number of fixed monitors that track a small number
of pollutants across their jurisdictions, and make use of standard protocols for
responding to accidental releases. Firms use common nonthreatening interpreta-
tions of accidental releases, calls for residents to "shelter in place," and internal
processes for classifying and assessing accidents. Often, these patterns of
behavior become second nature to those involved and are no longer open to
reconsideration or criticism. They are upheld to save time and energy, minimize
disagreement, and provide a shared plan for how workers should proceed under
uncertain circumstances.
The enactment and replication of scripts diminish the efficiency of bargaining
with a complex organization. Bargaining can grow out of incidents that briefly
call attention to organizational scripts. But to varying degrees the relevant role
assignments, standard operating procedures, and ceremonial behaviors remain
resilient, limiting each negotiation by constraining available solutions, offers,
and counteroffers. For example, prior to negotiations with Unocal, residents
generated a series of proposals, the most prominent of which concerned emer-
gency response and notification.20 7 Proposals included on-site community moni-
tors, odor and spill patrol teams, surveillance cameras linked to web sites,
community monitors inside the refinery to help with activation of public
notification systems, wiring fenceline monitors to agencies and residents' homes,
and neighborhood watch programs to avoid future accidents.2 °8 The proposals
were not adopted. Many were low-cost proposals, particularly in comparison to
provisions included in the final agreement, such as emissions monitoring technol-
ogy that proved ineffective at avoiding future Catacarb-type accidents. 20 9.None
of the scripts responsible for the Catacarb accident were successfully addressed
207. Reports from Committees in Negotiation Packet, Crockett-Rodeo Coalition (Nov. 13, 1994).
208. Emergency Response & Community Warning Issues for Negotiation, Crockett-Rodeo Coalition
Emergency Response & Community Warning Committee (Nov. 13, 1994).
209. Good Neighbor Agreement, supra note 17, at 9; see also infra notes 223-28 and accompanying
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during post-accident bargaining. Most readily excluded were ideas relating to
questioning normal operating procedures at the refinery and establishing new
roles for plant inspection, pollution patrols and citizen monitoring, and early
warning and notification. Very little of the agreement's financial allocations was
devoted to emergency preparedness or safety.
21"
Scripts constrain the negotiations that follow an accident in different ways.
Some of the scripts do not lend themselves to consideration by parties within a
limited window of opportunity (such as scripts pertaining to accident assess-
ment or how operators monitor emissions at the Unocal refinery).21 More
systemic scripts are resistant to change, having encouraged multiple work
groups, firms, or regulatory agencies to follow them (such as the accident
reporting and interpretation scripts that are often the initial source of frustration
for residents).21 2 Whether scripts cycle unseen through a negotiation process or
resist efforts at revision, a large portion of the potential gains from trade
(surplus from bargaining) are removed from consideration, sometimes before
negotiations even begin. This means that more efficient proposals for emissions
monitoring, reduction, and emergency preparedness are tabled or discounted in
favor of larger investments keyed to the institutional environment of the tar-
geted facility.
A facility also follows an internal decision making structure and values
options within the context of existing plant-wide initiatives, which are difficult
to decouple and link to isolated proposals raised during a negotiation. For
example, at any moment, the Conoco refinery is adapting to regulatory develop-
ments by making adjustments in two directions. First, new objectives are tied to
specific roles and personnel from upper management through various incen-
tives. Second, middle management use data in what is called a "plant informa-
tion system" to track emissions points; respond to "upticks" and regulatory
exceedances; carry out trend, incident, and root cause analyses; and propose
changes that account for budgetary constraints, systems effects, and plant
optimization goals.213 These streams of adjustment and adaptation are in motion
when the organization sits down to negotiate with other parties. They are
limited by the availability of information and workers' ability to process and
interpret it. For example, sulfur, a key focus of the Conoco negotiations, is not
uniformly monitored at the refinery; instead, a patchwork of regulations guides
the tracking of various chemicals.2" 4
210. Good Neighbor Agreement, supra note 17, at 3.
211. See supra notes 179-94 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
213. Telephone Interview with Air Program Leader, supra note 197; Interview with Environmental
Director, supra note 197.
214. One facility official noted that "environmental regulations apply to specific pieces of equip-
ment, so if your piece of equipment is covered by a specific regulation that requires a certain kind of
monitoring that's what you do." Interview with Environmental Director, supra note 197 (comparing
operations that require a continuous monitor to those for which the refinery uses input-output factors to
estimate emissions); see also Telephone Interview with Air Program Leader, supra note 197
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Industry-wide or projected regulatory changes also constitute institutionalized
expectations for bargaining, and they grow out of agency protocols and interac-
tions that begin years earlier. For example, Rh6ne Poulenc's agreement with
residents is more an encapsulation of existing and anticipated state requirements
(for audits, off-site monitoring, and data provision) and industry-wide initiatives
than a response to resident concerns before they assented to a Class-3 Permit
Modification for the facility. A public warning system was already negotiated
between facilities and officials in nearby cities (Channelview, Pasadena, and
Deer Park), particularly as part of the Local Emergency Planning Committees
mandated by EPCRA.21 5 The facility was already subject to an independent
auditor's assessment under Texas law when it included a similar program in its
agreement with residents.216 The only independent audit conducted at the
facility identified cost-effective ways to reduce accidental emissions and counter
corrosive materials used at the facility that were not addressed during negotia-
tions.217 Current projects at the facility, such as Layers of Protection Analysis,
mechanical integrity programs, and waste reduction efforts suggest opportuni-
ties that at the time were not imported from the firm's organizational field,
including other firms and regulators.2 18
Similarly, each accident sets off a unique ordering of administrative remedies
due to the division of labor among regulators, further constraining negotiations.
For example, after Conoco was targeted for sulfur dioxide releases and benzene
contamination, EPA and CDPHE initiated overlapping and independent enforce-
ment actions,219 which encouraged Conoco to fashion a supplemental environ-
mental project to respond to the core concerns of each action. Conoco drafted a
response to EPA's RCRA action and used that document as a template for
settlement that satisfied the core demands of EPA Region VIII and CDPHE as
expressed in the RCRA action and state actions as well as one set of the
residents' concerns. 220 By the time residents and Conoco reached an agreement,
sulfur dioxide emissions had already been addressed through a consent agree-
ment approved under EPA Region VIH's RCRA action and a compliance order
("[T]here[ are] multiple places where we have sulfur dioxide emissions .... There's one that has a
continuous monitor on it. There's one that's not yet been required.... And there are other sulfur
dioxide sources in the plant as well. And some of those are monitored more frequently, some less, a lot
of that dependent on the regulatory requirements.").
215. Renee Haines, Cities Near Plants Address Fears, Hous. CIRON., Jan. 3, 1993, at 1C.
216. 31 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 305.147.
217. Independent Auditor's Report Under 31 TAC 305.147: Rh6ne-Poulenc Basic Chemicals Com-
pany 13-15 (Sept. 24, 1993).
218. See, e.g., Bill Dawson, 75 Facilities Promise To Cut Emissions Under State Plan, Hous.
CHRON., Dec. 11, 1992, at 36A (describing the Texas Water Commission's Clean Industries 2000
program); Interview with Environmental Professionals, supra note 196.
219. See supra note 197.
220. See Status Report and Request for an Extension of Time, In re Conoco, Inc., No. RCRA (3008)
VI-97-03 (Jan. 22, 1998); Meeting Notice, Conoco Denver Refinery Sulfur Project Presentation (Feb.
17, 1998); Draft Settlement Discussions Between CoPIRG and Conoco, Suggested Meeting Agenda
(Mar. 10, 1998); Minutes of Settlement Discussions Between CoPIRG and Conoco (Mar. 31, 1998).
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issued by EPA and CDPHE.22" ' These efforts, again keyed to Conoco's organiza-
tional field, superseded resident attempts to pursue advanced warning concerns
or set precedents for other community-corporate relations.222
Finally, as the complexity of a proposed solution grows, it becomes more
difficult to identify the technology-based scripts that influence an agreement's
implementation. Technologies set limits on which actions their users can carry
out. For example, the primary means of avoiding Catacarb-type accidents at the
Unocal refinery was to agree to a fenceline monitoring system to keep track of
toxic air pollutants as they crossed the refinery's property line.223 The system
employed "open path optical remote sensors," which send beams of light
through the air toward reflectors and gather "fingerprints" of the chemicals that
pass by the light. Every time chemicals pass by the light, a portion of the beam
is absorbed, leaving a distortion in the beam of various wavelengths. These
fingerprints are compared to the monitor's internal library to determine the
chemical makeup of what passed through the beam.224 Implementing the technol-
ogy is exceedingly complex, involving issues such as the kind and location of
monitors; monitor spacing; compounds monitored; data recorded, summarized,
and made available to the public; system maintenance; and whether the system
will trigger the county's Community Warning System.225
The system did not lead to improved post-incident analysis, emergency
notification, or even information dissemination. 226 This was due to failure of the
parties to disentangle incompatible social networks (existing monitoring offi-
221. See Consent Order, In re Conoco, Inc., No. RCRA (3008) VI-97-03 (Aug. 11, 1998);
Compliance Order on Consent, In re Conoco, Inc., No. RCRA (3008) VIH-98-03, at 13 (Aug. 7, 1998);
Settlement Agreement and Release between COPIRG Citizen Lobby, Michael Maes, Lorraine Granado,
and Conoco, Inc. (Apr. 29, 1999).
222. Minutes to Telephone Meeting with Randy Weiner, Michael Mae, and Lorraine Granado (Apr.
7, 1998).
223. Memorandum of Understanding Between Crockett-Rodeo Coalition, Shoreline Environmental
Alliance, Communities for a Better Environment & Union Oil Company of California dba Unocal
(Nov. 3, 1996); SHORELINE ENVTL. ALLIANCE, CMTYS. FOR A BETTER ENV'T, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY
HEALTH SERvs., AND U.S. EPA REGION IX, OPTICAL OPEN PATH MONITORS AT THE Tosco SAN FRANcisco
REFINERY AT RODEO FENCELiNE 1 (May 2001).
224. CMTYS. FOR A BETTER ENv'T, REFINERY FENCELINE MONITORING USING LIGHT BEAMs To DETEcr
CHEMICALs AT THE FENCELINE OF THE Tosco, RODEO REFINERY (no date); SHORELINE ENvrL. ALLIANCE ET
AL., supra note 223, at 7-8.
225. CMrYs. FOR A BErER ENV'T, supra note 224; see also SHORELINE ENVTL. ALLIANCE Er AL., supra
note 223, at 1, 5-6, 7-8, 15; Good Neighbor Agreement, supra note 17, at 9-10; Unocal San Francisco
Refinery, Draft Monitoring Plan for the Unocal Perimeter Monitoring Evaluation Test Program, ENSR
Consulting and Engineering, at 1-2, 2-1, 3-1, 4-1 to 4-4 (Jan. 1995); Telephone Interview with Crockett
Resident (Oct. 31, 2002); Telephone Interview with Facilitator of Unocal Good Neighbor Agreement
(Aug. 29, 2002); Telephone Interview with Member of Shoreline Envtl. Alliance (May 31, 2002).
226. Letter to Debbie Sanderson, Contra Costa County Cmty. Dev. Dep't, from Fenceline Monitor-
ing Comm. (Apr. 12, 1999); Telephone Interview with Crockett Resident, supra note 225; Telephone
Interview with Member of Shoreline Envtl. Alliance (May 31, 2002); Letter from Kent G. Peterson,
Chair, Planning Advisory Comm., Crockett Improvement Ass'n, to Richard A. Belcher, RFG Project
Manager, 76 Products Company, at 2 (Jan. 29, 1996); Telephone Interview with Member of Shoreline
Envtl. Alliance (May 28, 2002).
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cials at the county and within the refinery) or build new networks of interest
groups affected by the technology (such as populations that required improved
detection time, monitoring of certain compounds, linkages to the county's
emergency notification network, and a means of comparing reported concentra-
tions to regulatory standards).227 Indeed, the technology made it impossible to
explore the kinds of efforts and relationships necessary to address future
incidents like the Catacarb spill-"level 2" incidents, where a dangerous sub-
stance is released over time without either the presence of an explosion with an
off-site impact, a fire visible off-site, or an expected off-site impact to human
health.228 At the same time, the kind, location, and spacing of monitors, data
recording methods called for by the system, and other decisions inherent in the
technology closed off other monitoring solutions from deliberation.
Table 3 summarizes how scripts, enacted to respond to each firm's institu-
tional context, constrained the potential efficiency of the negotiations that
followed.
C. NEW TRANSACTION COSTS: BARGAINING WITH COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS
As scripts cycle through an organization, they respond to and create new
kinds of transaction costs in a reciprocal process. The scripts found within a
complex organization, such as a petroleum refinery, are largely responses to
bounded rationality. Therefore, the transaction costs that they generate differ
from those that arise when parties engage in strategic behavior, such as when
multiple parties create the potential for holdouts and free riders. The costs differ
in two major respects: how they affect the bargaining space (potential surplus)
and the resources needed by the parties, courts, and policymakers to address
them. These new categories of transaction costs will change how we assess a
bargaining situation or compare the costs of various regulatory proposals. I take
up the former here and the latter in Part III. Let us return to a standard
Boomer-like analysis of an environmental nuisance and compare the traditional
transaction costs of concern to legal scholars with three additional categories of
transaction costs, each of which represents a distinct cost of negotiating and
enforcing agreements due to how organizations respond to their institutional
environment.
The textbook treatment of transaction costs places three patterns of costs at
center stage: holdout, free rider, and bilateral monopoly.229 For example, in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement C0._230 the New York Court of Appeals decided not
to award an injunction against a cement plant that was affecting neighboring
landowners because the large number of plaintiffs presented "high transaction
227. See generally SHORELINE ENvmL. ALLUANCE Er AL., supra note 223.
228. Id. apps. G, H; see also Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Commission, Draft Minutes
(Apr. 24, 1997); Telephone Interview with Crockett Resident, supra note 225.
229. See, e.g., THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMrrH, PROPERTY: PRINCiPLES AND PouciEs 38-40
(2007).
230. Boomer v. At. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y 1970).
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Table 3. Bargaining Outcomes and Efficiency Losses Due to Scripts.
Unocal Rh6ne Poulenc Conoco
Agreement Good Neighbor Community Audit Settlement
Reached Agreement Agreement Agreement
Signatories Crockett-Rodeo Manchester residents, Cross-Community
Coalition, Shoreline Texans United, Coalition
Environmental Rh6ne Poulenc representing
Alliance, Citizens Swansea and Elyria
for a Better communities,
Environment, CoPIRG, Conoco,
Unocal Corp. Inc.
Entitlement Approval of land use Approval of Class 3 Residents agree not to
Transfer permit for permit modification seek Compliance
reformulated fuels Order against
project refinery
Key Provisions Transportation Independent annual Supplemental
improvements, environmental and environmental
financial safety audit, project focused on
contributions, community advisory sulfur dioxide




Effect of Hidden or resistant Industry-wide and Overlapping
Scripts on emergency response regulatory scripts administrative
Bargaining and notification shape facility's scripts encourage
Efficiency scripts result in perceived control near-exclusive
tabling of more over reductions, focus on sulfur
efficient proposals; facility recovery problems;
new or incompatible improvements, and resident proposals
scripts limit timing of when for joint exploration
effectiveness of more efficient of odor sources,
technological proposals are on-site monitoring,
innovations viewed as and notification not
acceptable adopted
costs, especially holdout problems, that would make bargaining around an
injunction impossible., 23 The costs involved in a potential holdout include
identifying affected plaintiffs and convincing them to agree to a price that, in
the case of Boomer, is higher than their per capita loss of utility due to exposure
to plant emissions but lower than an amount that, when added to the asking




price of other residents, would discourage a trade of the entitlement. Con-
versely, if the court awarded the plaintiffs damages, then even if many of them
wanted to pay the cement plant to relocate or end its operations, it would only
take a small number of free riders to increase the per capita fee for remaining
residents to well above their willingness to pay. In either situation, there is a
bargaining range defined by potential gains from trade, and one or more
holdouts or free riders, who try to gain a disproportionate share of those gains,
limits the chance that a trade will take place.
One of the canonical examples of bilateral monopoly arose in the case of
Hendricks v. Stalnaker, which featured two neighboring landowners with inter-
ests in incompatible land uses (a water well and a septic system). 232 Topograph-
ical considerations led the defendant to locate a well near the plaintiff's
property, while the plaintiff proposed a septic system near the property line for
similar reasons.233 The plaintiff claimed that Mr. Stalnaker's well, completed
less than two weeks after he learned of the plaintiff's proposed septic system,
was a private nuisance.234 A balancing of the hardships led the court to reject
the plaintiff's claim.2 35 This case illustrates a classic bilateral monopoly where
each party can only bargain with the other. Again, the parties have an incentive
to behave strategically. Because they find themselves in a market with only one
seller and one buyer, the plaintiff and defendant are likely to engage in
prolonged negotiations and to try to extract a disproportionate share of the gains
from trade.236
In each of the three situations, the parties cannot effect an efficient trade:
multiple parties or a limited market (or both) leads one or more parties to
behave strategically, resulting in either no trade (leaving all gains on the table)
or one that is extremely costly to execute (eliminating much of the gains from
trade). Script-based transaction costs, which I label "overlap," "mismatch," and
"rigidity" costs, operate somewhat in reverse. Each cost reflects a different
manner in which scripts are embedded within an organization that is asked to
bargain or enact a regulatory innovation. A script is embedded when there is an
"overlap between artifacts and expectations generated from routine perfor-
mances and those generated from the enactment of other structures. 237 For
example, scripts for settling a particular case, monitoring fugitive releases at a
refinery, or handling citizen complaints within an agency might be strongly
embedded in guidance documents, a hierarchical organizational structure, or
standard operating procedures that suggest certain information is useful and
other data are not. The more each script is embedded, the more difficult it will
232. Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1989).
233. Id. at 199-200.
234. Id. at 200.
235. Id. at 202-03.
236. See Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STD. 1, 17-24 (1982).
237. Jennifer Howard-Grenville, The Persistence of Flexible Organizational Routines: The Role of
Agency and Organizational Context, 16 ORG. Sci. 618, 631 (2005).
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be to open it up for consideration. Choice is constrained by feedback from
existing systems, limiting the efficiency of agreements reached. Costs also
accrue according to the kinds of resources parties need to use to unearth and
revise existing scripts.
One way to distinguish among script-based transaction costs is to identify
where in an organization the scripts are embedded. Overlap costs arise when
scripts are embedded in coordination structures.2 38 Coordination represents the
"interdependence of action between multiple actors when accomplishing a
complex task,' 239 which can include any aspect of an organization's field: other
firms in an industry, suppliers, financiers, or regulators.240 For example, an
industrial organization is at any moment subject to multiple regulatory actions.
Each organization is run according to its own expectations and physical objects,
which influence who performs various tasks and how they are carried out.
During post-accident bargaining between Conoco and residents, several differ-
ent administrative processes provided expectations for what a settlement should
look like and which issues could be considered by the parties. Proposals for
joint exploration of odor sources, community technical consultation on equip-
ment upgrades, reduction of benzene emissions to groundwater, and early
warning technologies were incompatible with those expectations, regardless of
how efficiently they would have contributed to emissions reductions. In their
place was an agreement designed to address the overlapping concerns of several
agencies, such as their anticipated sulfur dioxide emissions reduction require-
ments.2 4' Reducing overlap costs requires identifying the formal and informal
authority needed to reorganize how multiple actors interact, as well as relational
resources such as trust across the actors generating each of the parallel adminis-
trative actions.242 Absent these efforts, firms will react by making proposals that
satisfy the core of as many of the overlapping requirements as possible while
discounting proposals that would prove more efficient but are less in line with
ongoing and anticipated requirements. Overlap costs thus operate in reverse of
free rider costs: they encourage agreement because too many overlapping
institutional responses are set in motion at once (reducing efficiency), as
opposed to too few offering needed payments (discouraging agreement).
Mismatch costs occur when scripts are embedded in technological structures
that guide and constrain what actions their users can carry out.2 4 3 For instance,
pollution monitoring choices (for example, continuous, parameter, hand-held)
demand widely varying organizational structures, collect different kinds of data
that can be used to address unique sets of questions, and allow for or discount a
238. See id. at 630.
239. Id.
240. Scott & Meyer, supra note 22.
241. See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
242. Howard-Grenville, supra note 237, at 634.
243. Geraldine DeSanctis & Marshall Scott Poole, Capturing the Complexity in Advanced Technol-
ogy Use: Adaptive Structuration Theory, 5 ORG. Sci. 121, 125-26 (1994).
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range of interactions between regulators, industry, and residents. Unocal's
experience with a fenceline monitoring system is instructive in this regard. To
avoid spending millions of dollars on a system that did not accomplish its
primary objectives and could not be used to avoid Type 2 accidents like the
Catacarb release, parties at the bargaining table would have had to use both
allocative and relational resources. Allocative resources such as funding, knowl-
edge, and technical expertise would be needed to alter existing monitoring
scripts. 2" Relational resources are necessary to address the networks of actors,
operating through mutual respect for certain kinds of skills and expertise,
generated by monitoring technologies already in use.245 Incompatible artifacts
and social networks that are not matched to the stated objectives of a new
technology constrain the efficiency of an agreement as it is adopted. They serve
as holdouts, siphoning off many of the gains from trade including anticipated
reductions in emissions, though they often do not become apparent until after an
agreement is set in motion.
Rigidity costs are the most pernicious impediments to an efficient agreement.
They are the product of scripts embedded in cultural structures, including
"norms of appropriate behavior that enable and constrain particular types and
sequences of action. ' 24 6 An industrial accident briefly exposes what are viewed
as appropriate means of addressing facility upsets and accidental releases,
sampling and risk assessment, and emergency response-the very issues consid-
ered before parties agree to transfer an entitlement. For example, the Catacarb
release revealed areas of plant management and operations that magnified the
extent of the accident. Those scripts are embedded in cultural structures, which
over time frame the shared meanings, norms, and identities of refinery manage-
ment and operators. Problem solving after an accident is channeled along paths
consistent with these cultural structures and ignores options that, although more
efficient, would threaten the legitimacy or stability of those institutions. Some
rigidity costs are unavoidable because certain scripts are replicated and exported
to other parts of a firm's institutional context in the form of recurrent, taken-for-
granted rules, activities, and patterns of interaction. Others can be addressed by
identifying the authoritative and relational resources needed to reopen scripts, in
part through collaboration with regulators familiar with the practices common
to facility management.247 Scripts embedded within both cultural and coordina-
tion structures include the kinds of ceremonial and legitimacy-seeking behav-
iors that are at the heart of organization theory's institutionalist focus. Rigidity
costs act in a fashion similar to bilateral monopoly, removing large swaths of
the bargaining range regardless of whether an agreement is reached.
Table 4 presents the categories of transaction costs based on bounded rational-
244. Howard-Grenville, supra note 237, at 634.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 630.
247. Id. at 634.
2010]
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JouRNAL
Table 4. Transaction Cost Classes and Efficiency Effects.
Transaction Effects on Bargaining
Cost Class Root Cause Efficiency Resources Needed
Holdout Strategic behavior, Parties seek more than Party identification,
multiple entitlement fair share of gains coordination
holders from trade; lower
probability of
agreement
Free Rider Strategic behavior, Parties seek more than Party identification,
multiple entitlement fair share of gains coordination
holders from trade; lower
probability of
agreement
Bilateral Strategic behavior, thin Parties seek to exploit Coordination (of
Monopoly market (usually one joint interest in incompatible land
buyer and one seller property, capture large uses or expanded




Overlap Bounded rationality, Solutions not in line Authoritative,
scripts embedded in with the core, multiple relational
coordination institutional responses
structures affecting are crowded out
single entitlement pre-agreement
holder
Mismatch Bounded rationality, Incompatible artifacts Allocative,





Rigidity Bounded rationality, Norms of appropriate Authoritative,
scripts embedded in behavior remove large relational





ity and compares them to costs related to strategic behavior that are of interest
to legal scholars.
As illustrated by the court's hesitance to award an injunction in Boomer,
courts are concerned about transaction costs because they increase the risk that
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an entitlement, when assigned to the wrong party (for reasons of efficiency or
equity), will remain in place.248 Liability and property rule comparisons are
therefore made in the context of "overcoming strategic obstacles to successful
negotiations" 249 to ensure that rights will come to rest in the parties that value
them most. The Cathedral set the course for arguments based on strategic
behavior, including when liability rules should be used to overcome the poten-
tial for holdouts and free riders to lock in an inefficient award of a property
right.250 For example, Ayres and Talley argue that a liability rule, which is a
divided entitlement because it gives nonowners a chance to take it and pay
damages, reduces each party's incentive to misrepresent how they value an
entitlement.251 Over time, the choice between property and liability rules was
also framed in terms of information costs to parties, courts (referred to as
assessment costs252), or both. Krier and Schwab note that under a liability rule,
"the party who is the best chooser," which is usually "the smallest-number
party" such as the polluting facility in Spur Industries,2 53 should be given the
choice of whether to engage in a forced entitlement sale.254 Kaplow and
Shavell, also optimistic about the decision making abilities of a single entity,
suggest that liability rules allow courts to "harness the information that the
injurer naturally possesses about his prevention cost. '255 Similarly, information
costs are used to show the optimality of property rules and of placing them
under the control of a single owner. For Merrill and Smith, as the number of
potential claimants to a property right grows, it makes sense to place within one
party the ability to coordinate use of a given resource.256
Compared to the strategic and informational problems caused by multiple
parties on one side of a dispute, the overlap, mismatch, and rigidity costs that
act upon a single firm lead to a different set of considerations for the courts. The
unique script-based transaction costs that affect complex organizations suggest
that courts should pay closer attention to the lone facility on the other side of the
table when they assess entitlement placement. High overlap costs can steer a
firm toward an agreement, but one that is suboptimal. The inefficiencies encour-
aged by overlap costs are at times even apparent to multiple parties on the other
side of a dispute who, because they are not prone to the same institutional
effects, are able to fashion more efficient terms of an entitlement transfer. The
resources needed to address overlap costs rival those demanded by the presence
of free riders. Mismatch costs are similarly masked by the willingness of a firm
248. Smith, supra note 231.
249. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 4, at 590.
250. Sterk, supra note 4, at 1290-91.
251. Ayres & Talley, supra note 100, at 1030-31.
252. Krier & Schwab, supra note 14, at 460-64.
253. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
254. Krier & Schwab, supra note 14, at 470-71.
255. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 725.
256. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. Rev.
773, 793-96 (2001).
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to agree to an entitlement transfer based on technological conditions-the costs
eliminate much of the perceived efficiency of bargaining post-agreement. Rigid-
ity costs in particular diminish the notion that a complex organization is in the
best position to decide whether to engage in a forced entitlement sale because
the costs grow out of scripts that operate beyond the scope of cost-benefit
analysis and are designed to meet objectives other than efficiency. Taken
together, the costs warrant more careful analysis of institutional effects when
judges and regulators assign property rights. In particular, forms of entitlement
protection that spread decision making authority across parties in ways that
uniquely address problematic scripts should be used. I explore implications for
environmental regulation below.
III. ENACTING ENVIRoNMENTAL LAWS: ACCOUNTING FOR INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS
Coase took interest in "smoke nuisances" to explore the role of institutions in
solving the pollution problem. That concern, dutifully furthered and extended
by new institutional economics and organization theory, was perhaps unfortu-
nately reframed by The Cathedral in the form of a question: who should have
an entitlement to be free from pollution, and what legal rules should protect
those rights? 257 Since then, legal scholars have used the property rule/liability
rule distinction to evaluate a growing range of regulatory options: pure contrac-
tual exchange among polluting firms and affected groups, tort law, command-
and-control, market-oriented, informational, and even voluntary initiatives among
polluters.258 The continuum of options, or sometimes just a portion of it, is often
presented as evolutionary history.259 Toward its center, we find lumbering
bureaucracies, acting on incomplete information and setting "best available
technology" standards from afar.260 The Cathedral led scholars toward either
end of the continuum, arguing that property rights should be given to "the party
or activity which can with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to
correct an error in entitlements., 26 1 Regulated industries are accepted as the
"lowest-cost avoiders," possessed of better information about pollution control
options and marginal costs and, under the right conditions, incentives to inno-
257. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
258. For an overview of the range of environmental regulatory options, see Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEx. L. REv.
1409, 1414-20 (2008). But see Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000
U. Iu. L. REV. 83, 98-100, 101, 106, 108 (reminding us of the virtues of technology-based regulation in
encouraging meaningful pollution control when compared to incentive-based approaches).
259. For a number of principled criticisms of command-and-control regulation, see Richard B.
Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 27-36 (2001).
260. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 111 (h), 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006); Clean Water Act § 301(b)(2)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1314 (2006). For a critique of EPA's "best available technology" strategy, see Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1335-37
(1985).
261. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1096-97.
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vate that are crushed under the weight of command-and-control regimes.262
From a presumption of "better access to information" or a "better position to
assess risks," scholars map what they view as inescapable arguments for how
either liability rules 263 or property rules26 4 can take advantage of the superior
position of polluting firms. The arguments reflect two Coasean blind spots.
First, a firm's response to transaction costs generates and embeds scripts within
the organization in ways that over time can divert it from efficiency. Second, a
firm, particularly when it is considered apart from its institutional context and
told to make decisions on its own, is uniquely susceptible to scripts in ways that
informal groups or new arrangements of stakeholders are not. The reciprocal
nature of transaction costs means that attempts to avoid strategic costs can
substitute a different and more pervasive set of costs on regulated entities.
Unknowingly affected by these blind spots, we move away from command-
and-control toward either Coasean contracting or market and informational
approaches. As we do so, responsibility for decision making and providing
needed information shifts to the regulated firm (and in the case of contracting,
to both firms and potential victims of pollution),265 and the state's role is
reduced. Among market solutions, a regulatory agency sets either the price (P)
of an entitlement to pollute or be free from pollution (through a pollution tax) or
the allowable quantity (Q) of an entitlement (under an emissions trading
regime).266 Under informational regulation, agencies reduce information costs
by aggregating and reporting firm-generated data and leave the firms to set P
and Q.267 At the other end of the spectrum (pure contracting), polluters and
victims, assuming clearly delineated property rights, determine P and Q as an
outcome of bargaining.268
Transaction costs keep us from moving too far in the direction of purely
Coasean bargaining, 269 broadly favoring liability rules. They also affect our
ability to enact market-based regulation. Although price and quantity instru-
ments theoretically can generate the same degree of cost-effective pollution
reduction,270 taxes (a liability rule protection) are considered less susceptible to
262. Wiener, supra note 68, at 714-19.
263. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 4, at 719; Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation
of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 359 (1984).
264. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2096-2105 (1997).
265. Esty, supra note 2, at 149.
266. Wiener, supra note 68, at 705.
267. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Perfor-
mance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 283-86 (2001).
268. James E. Krier & W. David Montgomery, Resource Allocation, Information Cost and the Form
of Government Intervention, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 89, 96-104 (1973).
269. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1,
34-35 (2003).
270. Wiener, supra note 68, at 728.
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transaction costs than tradeable emissions. 7 In the presence of high transaction
costs,
an initial assignment of a property rule entitlement between source and victim
may be determinative and the truly efficient reallocation of the entitlement
[such as by trading emissions allowances] may be blocked; in such cases, the
liability rule [price instruments] with damages set equal to harm is superior to
the property rule [quantity instruments].272
Thus, transaction costs establish a hierarchy among regulatory options, with
pure contracting preferred overall but presumed unlikely due to large-n strategic
and informational problems 27 3 market-based regulations preferred over technol-
ogy- or standards-based programs, 274 and price-based approaches preferred over
tradeable allowances within market-based regulatory options.275
The hierarchy of environmental regulatory options is shaped by the notion
that a regulated firm is best able to decrease emissions in an efficient way. The
"least-cost" decision maker role fuels arguments for market-based regulation,
Coasean contracting, and voluntary initiatives.276 But under the lens of a more
complete institutionalism, we find a cautionary version of this brave new world,
where greater demands are placed on complex organizations that are not driven
entirely by efficiency in their operations. The movement toward market-based
solutions, for example, is motivated by a belief in the need to reduce private
transaction costs, 277 yet pushing decision-making authority to firms and other
large-scale operations can increase script-based transaction costs, as this Article
has demonstrated. Our increasing faith in informal, norm-based forms of regula-
tion 2 78 also fails to consider how norms can lock in behavioral responses that
over time increase rigidity costs. And we shy away from property rule solutions
when multiple parties appear on one side of a dispute,2  vesting substantial
authority within a single party when it is often the absence or improper
271. Id. at 730-32. But see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan Gilligan, Indi-
vidual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REv. 1701, 1755-56 (2008) (discuss-
ing how transaction costs can serve as a hindrance to the effectiveness of a carbon tax).
272. Wiener, supra note 68, at 733.
273. Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design
Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's
C0 2 Emissions Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 865, 882-85
(2005).
274. Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era
from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 12-15 (1991); Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of
Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1174
(1998).
275. Wiener, supra note 68, at 682, 733-34.
276. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 8, at 80; Esty, supra note 2, at 145.
277. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 8, at 80; Esty, supra note 2, at 145.
278. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 909 (1996)
(describing the importance of understanding social norms in crafting regulatory frameworks).
279. See supra note 4.
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grouping of important parties that eliminates efficiency gains through mismatch
and overlap costs.
Inefficiencies brought about by organizational decision making suggest that
the debate over appropriate modes of regulation should move beyond discrete
choice to a more integrated analysis of available options. Script-based transac-
tion costs offer a unique lens through which the proper amalgam of command-
and-control, market, informational, and norm-based regulations can be set in
place. Unlike private or public transaction costs, they arise across organizational
fields and demand the attention and resources of firms and regulators alike. The
goal of reducing script-based transaction costs can guide parties toward other-
wise lost opportunities to achieve cost-effective pollution control and encourage
new forms of interaction among regulated firms, agencies, and third parties.
A. BEYOND DISCRETE CHOICE
Arguments for one regulatory approach over another tend to focus on reduc-
ing either private or public transaction costs. 2 80 Rarely are the costs considered
together. For example, the acid rain deposition cap-and-trade system enacted
under Title IV of the Clean Air Act 281 allowed parties to reduce acid rain
precursor emissions with minimal private transaction costs, but only because of
preexisting public costs: the system relied on permit, monitoring, and enforce-
ment requirements already in place under the Act; was limited to a single
industry whose customers were protected by rate regulation; and concerned
only two pollutants for which a network of pollution control equipment was in
use. 2 8 2 The nation's first emissions trading program, which encouraged the
phase-out of leaded gasoline, also experienced low private transaction costs
because it was confined to refineries with common trading experience and
utilized an EPA-administered banking system for lead rights.28 3 Similarly, the
EPAs 33/50 program, which sought voluntary toxic emissions reductions, was
successful in large part due to related requirements under the Clean Air Act
Amendments.2 84 Economists note that private transaction costs are not always
reduced to a greater extent than corresponding increases in public or administra-
280. Public transaction costs include the costs of administering various regulatory programs and can
be compared with the costs of private ordering, such as bargaining among private parties. Driesen &
Ghosh, supra note 8, at 76, 80-82 (showing how comparisons of public to private transaction costs can
implicate whether a liability or property rule is more appropriate under given circumstances); Eugene
Kontorovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REv.
755, 766-67 (2004) (same).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 7651.
282. Thomas D. Peterson, Robert B. McKinstry, Jr. & John C. Dernbach, Developing a Comprehen-
sive Approach to Climate Change Policy in the United States that Fully Integrates Levels of Govern-
ment and Economic Sectors, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 247-49 (2008).
283. Barry D. Solomon, New Directions in Emissions Trading: The Potential Contribution of New
Institutional Economics, 30 EcoLoGmcAL ECON. 371, 375 (1999).
284. Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing the EPA To Conform with the
New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 1, 32-33 (1998).
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tive costs-meaning, in some cases, command-and-control regulation should be
preferred."8 5
Debates about private and public transaction costs are helpful in deciding
whether to set, and the appropriate scale of, a discrete policy option. For
example, public transaction costs can be increased to locate parties or provide
dispute resolution resources to avoid protracted litigation,286 or private transac-
tion costs such as newly required continuous monitoring can facilitate oversight
of tradeable emissions permits. But these tradeoffs have yet to encourage a
conversation over how the various points of the regulatory spectrum should be
brought to bear on environmental problems. Script-based transaction costs, and
the unique combinations of resources needed to address them, can encourage
such a discussion. Because they are generated across regulated firms and by
overlapping administrative efforts, script-based transaction costs speak to the
appropriate scale, flexibility, and combination of regulations needed so that
opportunities for cost-effective risk reduction are preserved.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL FIELDS AS REGULATORY REGIMES
Property theorists have long treated large-n bargaining situations as an ob-
stacle to more efficient assignment and protection of entitlements to pollute or
be free from pollution. Script-based transaction costs suggest otherwise. Al-
though multiple parties can increase strategic behavior and coordination costs, it
is also true that complex firms, particularly when acting alone, are unable to
address a substantial set of independent costs. Drawing broader boundaries
around affected parties can be the basis for more efficient-solutions. As opposed
to the "matching principle" in environmental law, which dictates that "the
geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the
appropriate governmental level for responding to the pollution,"2 script-based
transaction costs dictate that the scope of a regulatory response should be
guided by which parties are in a position to question or change scripts that
underlie such costs. The boundaries should map along an issue's unique institu-
tional context or organizational field.289 The EPA, through its Office of Enforce-
285. Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control Efficient?: Institutions,
Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental
Protection, 1999 Wisc. L. REv. 887, 889-92.
286. See, e.g., Karl S. Bourdeau & Steven M. Jawetz, 25 Years of Superfund Liability, DAmy ENV'T
REP. (BNA), No. 9, Jan. 13, 2006, at B-I, B-7 to B-9 (explaining EPA-issued model administrative
orders and consent decrees to encourage settlement).
287. See, e.g., Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 8, at 95.
288. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case for
Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 23, 25 (1996); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 130,
157 (2005) (discussing the potential inefficiencies and harms from the matching principle in environmen-
tal law).
289. See Scott & Meyer, supra note 22 (defining institutional context). For a general discussion of
how the boundaries of an environmental problem are a function of geography and time, see de
Medeiros, supra note 68, at 561-62.
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ment and Compliance Assurance, has in recent years moved in the opposite
direction. In 2000, it shifted from global settlements to consent decrees affect-
ing individual facilities, such as refineries.290
When an agency and group of facilities negotiate a settlement, consent
decree, or supplemental environmental project291 concerning, for example, how
best to monitor fugitive emissions, the appropriate stakeholders should include
not just upper management and federal officials, but also operators, systems
optimizers, and engineers who design, use, and rely on existing and competing
technologies; officials in environmental, public health, and occupational safety
departments who have expertise in how monitoring should proceed; and nongov-
ernmental organizations that have developed their own capacity and techniques
for sampling and monitoring emissions.292 Grouping together parties according
to the scripts they uphold will allow them to disentangle social networks and
artifacts that are incompatible with proposed technology changes and to deter-
mine whether the new technology will conflict with other environmental manage-
ment goals within a facility or across a regulated industry. At the same time,
parties can be encouraged to question existing norms of appropriate behavior,
particularly those that are broadly accepted by designers, facility workers,
managers, or government officials. And agency officials from various levels of
government and seemingly unrelated departments can be brought together to
ensure that their actions do not crowd out novel or more efficient ideas that are
not immediately compatible with discrete and overlapping enforcement or
settlement actions. Using anticipated script-based transaction costs to identify
parties and shape the boundaries of environmental regimes provides a mecha-
nism for the kind of modular environmental regulation proposed by Freeman
and Farber.293 The question moves from how to avoid large-n bargaining
scenarios to which parties, issues, and levels of management, operations, and
regulation must be included. The answer is motivated by scripts, where they are
embedded, and what resources are necessary to open them up for review. In
shaping new regimes, script-based transaction costs encourage boundary work
akin to the firm-level adjustments that are of interest to new institutional
economics, only on a grander scale. Unlike regimes encouraged by the match-
ing principle or standard media-specific regulatory frameworks, regimes guided
290. Pamela Najor, EPA Needs To Prod Compliance Efforts by Oil Refineries, Inspector General
Says, 35 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1409, 1409 (2004).
291. Id. (stating that by 2004, refineries agreed to $25 million worth of supplemental environmental
projects); Patrice Ware, EPA Says It Will Concentrate on Cases that Provide Best Results for Environ-
ment, 38 ErNv'T RaP. (BNA), No. 3, Jan. 9, 2007, at S-34 (noting 80% of refining industry's capacity is
covered under consent decree).
292. See, e.g., United States v. Calcasieu Refining Co., No. 2:08-cv-1215 (W.D. La. Aug. 19, 2008),
available at http://www.deq.state.1a.us/portal/portals/ /enfrorcement/bep/pdf/Calcasieu-Refining-CD.
pdf (depicting a typical consent decree between the Department of Justice and a single refinery
including an agreement to reduce emissions and install new heater and boiler controls).
293. Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DuKE L.J. 795, 800
(2005).
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by the need to address script-based transaction costs should not focus on a
single category of emissions or environmental harm. Rather, their scope should
be influenced by the categories of scripts at issue (such as those affecting
facility responses to accidents, unique groupings of environmental management
procedures, or technology adoption) and the organizational field in which they
operate. The goal should be to safeguard the efficiency that is otherwise lost
when environmental regulation is pushed too far in the direction of either pure
command-and-control or internal organizational decision making.
To succeed with a program aimed at questioning and refining organizational
scripts, existing regulations will have to be altered. Strict monitoring and
evaluation requirements should be in place, and parties should be granted
limited immunity for pursuing improvements across areas of operation or
environmental media. There is certainly room for such regime formation in
environmental law, which is unique in its tolerance for regulatory slippage.294
Regulated parties have, in the space between existing and enacted standards,
gained considerable experience negotiating compliance steps with other parties.
But we cannot rely simply on more negotiation, particularly when it involves
only a single regulated firm. Existing programs, such as Project XL and
Supplemental Environmental Projects, are designed for individual point sources
that are in violation of standards in place and that trigger an enforcement
response.2 95 Although they encourage parties to create pilot projects and imple-
ment new measures in order to avoid fines, such programs do not operate at a
scale dictated by a firm's institutional context, where script-based transaction
costs can be addressed.
C. SHAPING THE MANAGERIAL TURN
The task of assembling unique groupings of parties who can question and
reform outmoded scripts has direct implications for "management-based" regula-
tion, which has seen a resurgence in environmental law.296 Managerial strate-
gies depart from performance- and technology-based approaches that focus on
end-of-pipe conditions and ignore the internal workings of firms. The goal is to
change organizational norms through targeted influence over a firm's self-
regulatory practices and a mandate that firms engage in certain rulemaking
efforts. In environmental law, this approach can be traced to the environmental
management systems (EMSs) in use at facilities such as those owned by
*Unocal.297 EMSs introduce their own scripts, in the form of standard operating
294. Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in
Environmental Law, 23 HItv. ENvTL. L. REV. 297, 301-11 (1999).
295. Id. at 309-11.
296. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Manage-
ment to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & Soc'y. Rav. 691, 696-700 (2003) (describing the use of
managerial regulation in the areas of food safety, chemical accident avoidance, and pollution preven-
tion).
297. See, e.g., supra notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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procedures designed to "ensure compliance with regulatory standards" and
"improve the firm's environmental performance" 298 and evaluative institutions
developed by regulators and standard-setting bodies such as the International
Organization for Standardization. They also hold the potential to disrupt scripts
by promoting continuous review and improvement of existing practices:
To create an EMS, managers begin by establishing environmental goals and
creating a specific plan to achieve those goals. Managers and workers are
assigned responsibilities for implementing parts of the plan, and they are
trained in what they need to carry out these responsibilities. They keep
records that document their compliance with the plan and periodically the
firm (or an outside auditor) reviews these records and assesses the firm's
performance in meeting its goals and following its internal procedures. These
periodic reviews are supposed to feed into revisions and continuous improve-
ments in the firm's overall system.299
At their best, EMSs encourage practices that mimic some of the characteristics
of "high reliability organizations" (HROs), which avoid accidents even though
they operate technologically complex systems, such as nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers, on a regular basis. 300 The goal is not to identify an ideal array of
scripts, 30 1 but to create a space in which practices such as learning from
previous errors and continuous socialization around matters of compliance will
take place.302 At the same time, EMSs might defy other elements of HROs,
including underspecification of structures and trial-and-error learning, as they
require firms to implement certain kinds of procedures.30 3
A broad range of initiatives, such as the National Environmental Performance
Track, 3°4 risk management planning under the Clean Air Act,305 and the Massa-
chusetts Toxic Use Reduction Act,30 6 promote EMSs and try to shape how firms
298. Cary Coglianese, The Managerial Turn in Environmental Policy, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 55
(2008).
299. Id. at 56.
300. See generally Karl E. Weick & Karlene H. Roberts, Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful
Interrelating on Flight Decks, 38 ADMIN ScI. Q. 357 (1993).
301. Practical drift, the "slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written procedure" across
multiple levels of organization, suggests that calibrating an optimal array of scripts a priori would
prove difficult at best. SCOTT A. SNOOK, FRIENDLY FIRE: THE ACCIDENTAL SHOOTDOWN OF U.S. BLACK
HAWKS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ 179-201, 220 (2000) (demonstrating how practical drift while operating
in a no fly zone in Iraq resulted in the destruction of two Black Hawk helicopters by F-15C fighter
aircraft).
302. DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVI-
ANCE AT NASA 415-22 (1996).
303. Id.
304. Coglianese, supra note 298, at 57-58..
305. Id. at 59.
306. Id. at 59-60.
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engage in environmental planning. 30 7 Each program identifies broader elements
of a firm's internal Planning, such as monitoring procedures, evaluative mea-
sures, hazard identification, and risk reduction.30 8 The details of these and other
planning practices are often left to the discretion of the firm.309 Excitement over
management-based regulation is bolstered by ethnographic studies suggesting
that for industries such as pulp and paper, internal variables including manage-
ment style explain more of a firm's environmental performance than the degree
of regulatory enforcement or external economic conditions.310 Yet we know
little about the success of EMS programs. Research has focused on factors that
motivate a firm to adopt an EMS or whether gains in certain indicators
post-adoption, such as toxic emissions reductions, can be teased out from
broader improvements in an industry.311 And there is the possibility that, as
predicted by the new institutionalists, firms adopt these systems in order to
maintain legitimacy rather than to improve performance.312
Scripts offer a methodology for further opening the "black box" of the
corporation and examining to what extent internal practices and procedures can
be revised or improved as part of an EMS. Longitudinal studies could compare
clusters of scripts that constitute the interaction order of a firm before and after
adoption of an EMS, map their constituencies through network analysis, or
examine the resources that were needed for their revision. Cross-sectional
analyses could identify scripts at work in different industries or at the plant level
across similar facilities within a single industry. The results would suggest
whether adjustments to traditional enforcement mechanisms, including penalty
mitigation, audit privilege, technical assistance, and reporting requirements, are
needed to facilitate a management culture in which scripts are identified and
reviewed rather than ignored, retained for performative reasons, or adhered to
during a crisis.313 They would also point to the appropriate scale of a manage-
ment-based program, from facility groupings to industrial classification codes to
unique arrays of parties that form the institutional context for the clusters of
scripts that are identified. With scripts as the unit of analysis, organizational
307. EMSs are encouraged by government- or industry group-sponsored programs (such as the
National Environmental Performance Track or Responsible Care, respectively) or emerge as individual
company efforts to commit to performance goals. Kurt A. Strasser, Do Voluntary Corporate Efforts
Improve Environmental Performance?: The Empirical Literature, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. Rav. 533,
534-36 (2008).
308. Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 296, at 694.
309. Id. at 713.
310. Coglianese, supra note 298, at 61.
311. Coglianese, supra note 298, at 65-68; Jennifer A. Howard-Grenville et al., Constructing the
License to Operate: Internal Factors and their Influence on Corporate Environmental Decisions 4-16
(Corporate Social Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 27, 2007; Strasser, supra note 307, at
537-542).
312. Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Organizational Trust and the Limits of Management-
Based Regulation, 43 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 865, 868 (2009).
313. Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to Implement Environmental
Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. Ervm. L.J. 662, 674-98 (2003).
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change is considered the adjustment of individual scripts in response to new
institutional templates.314 Better understanding those adjustments would sup-
port a new body of research on the effectiveness of management-based forms of
regulation.
D. INSTITUTIONAL FLEXIBILITY: ENCOURAGING MARKETS FOR SCRIPTS
An assumption that drives not just management-based regulation but much of
the conversation in environmental law is that regulators should give the lowest-
cost avoider, the "party who is the best chooser," '315 unique jurisdiction over
entitlement-based decisions. Simply allow a regulated entity to set marginal
control costs equal to marginal benefits, and a superior result will follow. These
incentives-based arguments suggest that command-and-control regulation is by
comparison rigid and inefficient.
Script-based transaction costs demonstrate that regulated firms are not nearly
as free to steer their behavior toward efficient risk regulation as we would like
to believe. They also suggest we should ensure sufficient flexibility or "slack" in
a regulatory system so that existing scripts, particularly those that lead to
rigidity costs, can be questioned and replaced. Flexibility remains a goal, but its
locus should include not just the internal affairs of a firm but also its institu-
tional context. Scholars are rightfully concerned that command-and-control
statutes can lock in suboptimal technologies.31 6 They should also contend with
regulatory developments that lock in suboptimal scripts. For example, the recent
trend toward federal preemption of state, local, and common law regulation in
statutes such as the Energy Policy Act of 2005317 threatens to eliminate sources
of competing facility siting, hazardous waste disposal, and risk reduction scripts
by state, local, and common law actors.318 Sadly, federal preemption measures
are driven by concerns over free-rider and coordination problems while they
remain silent about the effects of displacing "multilayered institutional arrange-
ments offering different actors, venues, and modalities for addressing a social
problem.
', 3 19
To avoid the ossification of existing rules and scripts and to safeguard the
adaptive capacity of an organizational field, agencies can serve as jurisdictional
brokers, setting boundaries and identifying the right mix of parties to address
314. Kathleen E. Voges et al., The Role of Organizational Template in Radical Change, 14 J. APPLIED
MGMT. & ENT'FmPRENEtuSHw' 27 (2009).
315. Krier & Schwab, supra note 14, at 470-71.
316. See supra note 274.
317. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 311(c), 119 Stat. 594, 685-87.
318. See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1553-56 (2007) (analyzing how federal preemption can displace
state and local legal development and the benefits of intersystemic interaction).
319. Id. at 1571-72, 1576.
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script-based transaction costs. They can also function as information brokers.32 °
Apart from simply selecting the best available technology or an ideal emer-
gency response process, they can create new markets for information about
competing monitoring, risk management, source reduction, and emergency
response solutions. Public agencies can draw out decentralized information
about the scripts employed by parties in an organizational field and make it
available for nongovernmental organizations and environmental managers to
critique, modify, aggregate, and present in new ways.
The roots of such a process, which should be aimed at identifying and
reducing script-based transaction costs, can be found in the EPA's "Incentives
for Self-Policing" audit policy 32 ' and the European Union's Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme.322 The latter is particularly bold in its requirement of
environmental statements, publicly available assessments of a company's "struc-
ture, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes, and resources" for enact-
ing environmental policy that are checked for compliance by a new profession
of "accredited environmental verifiers. 323 This process of drawing out informa-
tion on scripts and establishing markets for such information to be aggregated,
analyzed, and used to spur innovation can also build on the EPA's experience
with the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), an early success in informational
regulation.32" The TRI reduced information asymmetries between agencies and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and encouraged innovative data aggre-
gation by community groups.
325
An audit and environmental disclosure process should combine elements of
informational, market-based, and traditional regulation, with government serv-
ing auditor, jurisdictional and information broker, and agenda-setting roles. Its
primary objective would be to ensure constant scrutiny and innovation of
environmental management procedures by multiple parties (including indepen-
dent professionals and NGOs), with additional statutory flexibility for firms that
wish to make adjustments or promote change across an organizational field.
There is considerable potential for government to encourage such markets. For
example, a recent review of technology-based standards for point sources under
320. See Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MoM-r.
133, 134-35 (1995) (explaining how search and information costs may be the most onerous- form of
transaction costs and how brokers can play a role in reducing those costs).
321. Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Coerced Confessions: Self-Policing in the Shadow of the
Regulator, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 45, 49-50 (2008); Andrew Childers, Enforcement: EPA Moves
Forward with Audit Policy for Violations at Newly Acquired Facilities, DAmy ENV'T REP. (BNA), No.
148, Aug. 1, 2008, at A-6 to A-7.
322. Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1287-311 (1995).
323. Id. at 1300 (citing Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 2(e), 1993 O.J. (L 168) 2).
324. Karkkainen, supra note 267. But see William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclo-
sure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 151, 165-77 (2001) (highlighting the
informational shortfalls of the TRI).
325. See generally Archon Fung & Dara O'Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the
Grassroots Up: Explaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVm.
MGMT. 115, 116, 118-19 (2000).
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the Clean Water Act and new stationary sources under the Clean Air Act found
that the majority have never been revised, despite being in place for an average
of over twenty years. 326 Script-based transaction costs provide an avenue for
addressing the diminishing returns of existing environmental laws.
CONCLUSION
The Cathedral crafted one of the most powerful lenses in legal scholar-
ship.327 Yet what is happening in Norco, Swansea, Elyria, Manchester, Crockett,
Rodeo, Bayo Vista, and many other communities reveals cracks in the glass that
blur how we account for bargaining and set environmental policy. I identified
the Coasean blind spots that plague Calabresi and Melamed's heuristic device
and the transaction costs that they conceal. I also suggested the source of these
blind spots-the incomplete institutionalism of law and economics. Although
this Article is only a first step toward more effective pollution control, it is an
important one. After centuries of nuisance law and decades of experience with a
fragmented administrative state, we continue to leave vast efficiency gains
beyond our reach. This should come as no surprise, for when regimes are set in
place and rules promulgated without awareness of the complete set of costs
acting on a regulated industry, the law will fall short of meeting its goals. And
as anyone living near the Shell Chemical plant or Unocal refinery 328 will tell
you, those lost opportunities are vital to ensuring a more just distribution of
environmental harms.32 9
Correcting for the blind spots starts with a simple admission: as long as
complex organizations are charged with implementing our environmental laws,
Coase's institutional focus must be extended to more accurately and completely
account for organizational behavior. Scripts are an empirically helpful device
for accomplishing this goal. They are embedded within every regulated indus-
try, generating transaction costs in predictable ways and challenging our view of
the lowest-cost avoider. My analysis of environmental bargaining situations
demonstrates how scripts operate, removing gains from trade and agreed-to
regulatory changes. But they also provide a roadmap for crafting more effective
environmental laws. Scripts, and the transaction costs they generate, can focus
our adjustments to the appropriate scale, flexibility, and amalgam of responses
to a regulatory problem. They open a new frontier in addressing the diminishing
returns of environmental protection.
326. Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and the Problem
of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1701, 1720-22 (2008).
327. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1.
328. The Unocal refinery in Rodeo is now owned by ConocoPhillips. Accidents and shelter-in-place
notices continue. See, e.g., Accident Information--Conoco Phillips Rodeo Refinery, May 1, 2006-
Contra Costa Health Services, http://www.cchealth.org/groups/hazmat/release-conoco may-2006.php
(detailing a shelter-in-place order given after a power failure caused the refinery to flare combustible
materials).
329. See MAcEY, supra note 47.
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